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The Taxpayer's Duty of Consistency
STEVE R. JOHNSON*
I. INTRODUcrioN
A transaction may affect the taxpayer's federal tax liability for both
the current period and subsequent periods. No difficulty arises if the tax-
payer treats the transaction consistently over the periods. However, sig-
nificant tax distortions are possible if the taxpayer's characterization of
the transaction varies from period to period. A recharacterization may
be particularly troublesome if the statute of limitations has expired, and
the first period is not open to correction at the time the inconsistent rep-
resentation is made.
The duty of consistency was developed to address this problem. If the
duty applies, the taxpayer is not permitted to shift his position in the
subsequent period regardless of whether, as a matter of substantive tax
law, the position taken in the prior period was correct.' A hallmark of
the duty is flexibility. It has been applied to prevent taxpayers from tak-
ing inconsistent positions in order to exclude from all tax periods income
that clearly is taxable in some period,2 deduct the same expense in two or
more periods, 3 improperly inflate the basis of an asset,4 convert one type
of income into a different, tax-favored type5 and profit from other sorts of
tax abuses.6
There have been, however, differences among the courts in their per-
ception of the duty of consistency. 7 As Justice Frankfurter rightly ob-
* Senior attorney, Internal Revenue Service District Counsel Office, Jacksonville, Florida.
Visiting Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology-Chicago Kent School of Law, 1992-
93. This article was not written in the author's official capacity. The view expressed herein
are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Internal Revenue Service.
I See, e.g., Cassuto v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 256,264 (1989), aff'd in part and rcvd in part
as to another issue, 936 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1991).
2 E.g., Grayson v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 58, 60 (N.D. AL. 1977).
3 E.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 17, 18 (5th Cir. 1950).
4 Eg., Coldiron v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1084 (1987).
5 E.g., Stoecklin v. Commissioner, 54 T.CM. (CCH) 452, 459-60 (1987), aff'd per curiam
as to other issues, 865 F.2d 1221 (1lth Cir. 1989); Akron Dry Goods Co. v. Commiss oner, 18
T.C. 1143, 1151-52 (1952), aff'd, 218 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1954).
6 E.g., Kielmar v. Commissioner, 884 F.2d 959, 965 (7th Cir. 1989); Herrington v. Commis-
sioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying duty of consistency to prevent taxpayers from
removing from income the gain legs of sham straddles when statute of limitations prevented
adjustment of the loss legs), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1065 (1989).
7 See, e.g., Marco v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 544, 549 (1955); Meurlin v. Commissioner, 25
T.C. 118, 123 (1955).
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served, consistency decisions "disclose many views in various degrees of
conflict."s
This article attempts to clarify this aspect of the procedural tax law.
Section II sketches the emergence of the taxpayer duty of consistency, 9
and describes current formulations. The remaining three sections ad-
dress the major controversies surrounding the duty. Section III asks
whether there should be an enforceable taxpayer duty of consistency, and
resolves that question in the affirmative. In so doing, it proposes that the
justification for the duty of consistency should be grounded in practical
policy values fundamental to our tax system rather than the essentially
moralistic basis of prior decisions. Section IV describes the proposed ele-
ments of the duty of consistency. Section V charts the relationships be-
tween the duty of consistency and other anticonsistency doctrines. The
final section offers guidelines for determining when the duty of consis-
tency should yield to other devices used to counter inconsistency and
when the duty of consistency should preempt the other devices.
II. EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF THE DUTY OF CONSISTENCY
The duty of consistency has evolved through hundreds of decisions
over more than 60 years. 10 At its core, the doctrine reflects distaste for a
taxpayer's attempt to have his cake after already having eaten it. The
taxpayer, it is felt, should not be permitted to reduce his tax bill by re-
porting that one thing is true, and then, after expiration of the statute of
limitations, recanting and taking a different position on a later return.
The engine that drives the consistency doctrine is the sensibility that
truth should not change with the calendar.
A number of early decisions denied taxpayer claims based on inconsis-
tent representations without particular elaboration, apparently, on
8 Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483, 495 (lst Cir. 1948). A contemporary commentator
has observed that the duty of consistency is a "developing doctrine." Robert T. Smith, Sub-
stance and Form: A Taxpayer's Right to Assert the Priority of Substance, 44 Tax Law. 137,
144 (1990).
9 The government also may have a duty of consistency in tax cases. This question is ex-
plored in Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue Service to be Con-
sistent?, 40 Tax L. Rev. 411 (1985).
10 Not all of this litigation has proceeded under the rubric of duty of consistency. The
principle often is called "quasi-estoppel." See, e.g., LX Cattle Co. v. United States, 79-1
U.S.T.C. q 9282, at 86,616 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Unfortunately, the term quasi-estoppel some-
times also is used to refer to equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Theodore S. Lynn & Mervyn S.
Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion as Applied Against the United States in Fed-
eral Tax Controversies, 19 Tax L. Rev. 487 (1964). To add another layer of confusion, what is
in substance the duty of consistency sometimes is called "estoppel" (e.g., Joyce v. Gentsch, 141
F.2d 891, 896-97 (6th Cir. 1944)), or "election" (e.g., Georgia Properties Co. v. Henslee, 138
F. Supp. 587, 590 (M.D. Tenn. 1955)), despite the fact that equitable estoppel and the doctrine
of election are recognized rules distinct from the duty of consistency.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 46:
DUTY OF CONSISTENCY
grounds of equity. 1 Other decisions attempted to effect the desired re-
sult through a variety of legal and equitable doctrines, such as election,
waiver, equitable estoppel, contract principles, refund equities and
precepts of statutory construction. 12
Because of individual doctrinal limitations, however, none of these ap-
proaches was fully satisfactory, and the duty of consistency arose to fill
the void. Although prefigured by earlier decisions,13 the taxpayer duty of
consistency was established principally by the Supreme Court's decision
in R.H. Stearns Co. v. United States 14 and the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Alamo National Bank v. Commissioner.15
Those early decisions did not end controversy as to the duty.
Although the nuances in the post-Stearns cases are numerous, the deci-
sions distill into five principal analytical patterns: (1) cases explicitly or
implicitly rejecting any duty of consistency whatsoever, (2) cases uphold-
ing a duty only when most or all of the elements familiar to equitable
estoppel are present, (3) cases recognizing an expansive consistency duty
liberated from the equitable estoppel elements, (4) cases adopting a triune
standard somewhere between the second and third patterns and (5) cases
treating the duty of consistency as an adjunct to the tax benefit rule.
A. Cases Rejecting Any Consistency Duty
A few courts have rejected application of a duty of consistency in con-
clusory fashion, without explaining their rationale.16 Where reasons
have been given, two have predominated: (1) The duty of consistency is
an impermissible attempt by the Commissioner to circumvent the statute
of limitations by recovering, in an open tax period, a deficiency that
should have been collected with respect to an earlier period now closed to
assessment'7 ; and (2) application of the duty would distort the taxpayer's
true tax liability. s
11 See, eg., Magee v. United States, 282 U.S. 432, 434 (1931); Mahoning Inv. Co. v. United
States, 3 F. Supp. 622, 629 (Ct. CL 1933).
12 See, eg., Grubb v. United States, 38-1 U.S.T.C. 9151, at 9571-72 (S.D. Cal. 1936);
Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co. v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 126, 133-36 (Ct. CL 1933); Ralston
Purina Co. v. United States, 58 F.2d 1065, 1067-68 (Ct. CL 1932).
13 Although the pedigree blurs, Southern Pac. Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 990 (1930),
was perhaps the first trial court opinion identifiably imposing a duty of consistency, and Com-
missioner v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1932), and Haag v. Commis-
sioner, 59 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1932), were perhaps the first such opinions by appellate courts.
14 291 U.S. 54 (1934).
Is 95 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 577 (1938).
16 See, e.g., Marco v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 544, 549 (1955).
17 See, eg., Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376, 380 (6th Cir. 1956); Commis-
sioner v. Mnookin's Estate, 184 F.2d 89, 92-93 (8th Cir. 1950).
18 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Union Pac. R.R., 86 F.2d 637, 640 (2d Cir. 1936); Kenosha
Auto Transp. Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 421, 425 (1957).
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Cases stressing such considerations-and thus explicitly or implicitly
rejecting a taxpayer duty of consistency-have not been prominent since
the early 1970's. 19 However, the matter is not entirely settled. First, in
some circuits there have been so few duty of consistency opinions, and
these were issued so long ago, that the circuit law is unclear. 20
Second, there is at least one circuit, the Second Circuit, in which
precedents arguably favor an anticonsistency rule, at least in deficiency
actions. Initially well disposed to the duty,21 the Second Circuit devel-
oped into the circuit most hostile to it. The Second Circuit's opinions
freely mixed two strands of reasoning: (1) that certain elements of equi-
table estoppel were absent 22 and (2) that imposition of a duty of consis-
tency would traduce the statute of limitations and the annual method of
accounting for income taxes.23 While the first strand implies that a con-
sistency obligation properly may be imposed under some circumstances,
the second, taken to its logical conclusion, would bar a consistency obli-
gation under any circumstances, at least in deficiency actions.24
Third, very aggressive taxpayers might attempt to contest the legiti-
macy of a duty of consistency even in other circuits. This is because the
Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue unequivocally. The Stearns
19 See B.C. Cook & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 516, 521 (1972).
20 The District of Columbia Circuit is the clearest case in point. See Louis Werner Saw Mill
Co. v. Helvering, 96 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Newaygo Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering,
77 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1935). The Fourth Circuit also may fall into this class. Fourth Circuit
law can be cited for any of three views concerning the duty of consistency: (1) The duty
intrinsically is impermissible as contravening the statute of limitations (Clifton Mfg. Co. v.
Commissioner, 137 F.2d 290, 293 (4th Cir. 1943)); (2) the duty is operative only if the elements
familiar to equitable estoppel exist (Hull v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1937));
and (3) the duty is operative whether or not such elements are present (Interlochen Co. v.
Commissioner, 232 F.2d 873, 877-78 (4th Cir. 1956)). Since Interlochen did not discuss CifU-
ton, there may be room for a Fourth Circuit taxpayer to attack the very notion of a consistency
duty.
21 See Askin & Marine Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1933).
22 E.g., Helvering v. Brooklyn City R.R., 72 F.2d 274, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1934).
23 See, e.g., McCullough v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 345, 347 (2d Cir. 1946); Salvage v.
Commissioner, 76 F.2d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 1935), aff'd, 297 U.S. 106 (1936).
24 The Second Circuit repeatedly has emphasized, however, that different considerations
apply in refund actions because they are intrinsically equitable. See, e.g., United States v.
Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1950); Helvering v. Schine Chain Theatres, 121 F.2d
948, 950 (2d Cir. 1941).
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decision25 is susceptible to divergent interpretations,26 and subsequent
Supreme Court pronouncements have not formed a cohesive pattern 2 7
B. Cases Limiting the Consistency Duty by Equitable Estoppel
Elements
In Stearns, the Supreme Court stated that the rule of preclusion it was
applying "has its roots in a principle more nearly ultimate than... estop-
pel."28 While one might infer from this statement that the duty of con-
sistency should be based on independent criteria and not limited by the
technical elements of estoppel, numerous subsequent decisions have
hinged the consistency duty on whether various elements of equitable
estoppel were present in the case. This conflation of the doctrines was
not always fatal. In many cases, the government was able to satisfy the
burden imposed.29 More commonly, however, the claimed preclusion
failed due to the absence of one or more of the equitable estoppel
elements.30
There is little doubt that, at least until the articulation of the triune
standard discussed below,3' the dominant view incorporated the equita-
ble estoppel elements into the duty of consistency. The Tax Court and a
plurality of the federal circuit courts tended to this view.32 Moreover,
because there is no intrinsic incompatibility between the incorporationist
25RH. Steams Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54 (1934).
26 See American Light & Traction Co. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1121, 1123 (1940)
("[B]ecause the unnamed rule [of Stearns] is stated in such general terms, there is extreme
difficulty in knowing whether or not to apply it in particular cases."), aff'd, 125 F.2d 365 (7th
Cir. 1942). Reflecting such confusion, a number of later decisions interpreted Stearns as an
equitable estoppel case. E.g., Brewerton v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 503, 503 (Ct. Cl. 1935);
Barbados #7, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 804, 813 (1989).
27 See, e.g., McEachem v. Rose, 302 U.S. 56, 59-63 (1937), rev'g 86 F.2d 231 (5th Cir.
1936); Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106, 109 (1936), aff'g & remanding 76 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1935) (both appearing to disapprove of the consistency doctrine, but not formally rejecting it).
28 Stearns, 291 U.S. at 61-62.
29 See, e.g., Building Syndicate Co. v. United States, 292 F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 1961);
Brown v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 527, 532 (1. Or. 1968); Bartel v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
25, 32 (1970).
30 See, e.g., Studebaker-Packard Corp. v. United States, 61-2 U.S.T.C. 9551, at 81,312
(N.D. Ind. 1961); Deviney Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 413, 415 (1977);
Hunt v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 791, 797-98 (1968).
31 See Section II.D.
32 See e.g., Manhattan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 1032, 1042-43 (1957); Croslcy
Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376, 380-81 (6th Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Mellon, 184
F.2d 157, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1950); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Huston, 126
F.2d 196, 200-01 (8th Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Saltonstall, 124 F.2d 110, 112-13 (1st Cir.
1941); Hawke v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 946, 949, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 657
(1940); Lofquist Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 196, 200-01 (8th Cir. 1939).
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view and the triune standard, 33 it is fair to say that the former remains
the majority view today.
C. Cases Supporting an Expansive Consistency Duty
In contrast to the cases superimposing equitable estoppel elements
onto the duty of consistency, many other decisions have held that the
consistency rule does not require the presence of all the technical ele-
ments of estoppel.34 Consideration of this counterview is complicated by
two facts, however. First, if not all technical elements are required, the
question becomes: Which elements are dispensable? No court adopting
the expansive view has discussed that question in a comprehensive fash-
ion. Second, precedents often conflict even within the same circuit, ren-
dering it difficult to state with confidence whether these circuits espouse
or reject the incorporation of equitable estoppel elements into the duty of
consistency.35
D. Cases Adopting the Triune Standard
In McMillan v. United States,36 a federal district court distilled the
teaching of prior cases into the first comprehensive statement of the ele-
ments of the duty of consistency. The court found there were three ele-
ments: (1) The taxpayer made a representation of fact or reported an
item for tax purposes in one tax year; (2) the Service acquiesced in or
relied on that fact for that year; and (3) the taxpayer desires to change
the representation, previously made, in a later tax year after the first year
has been closed by the statute of limitations. 37
33 See text accompanying note 42.
34 E.g., Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 640, 659 (1984), aff'd in part & rev'd
in part as to other issues, 800 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 485 U.S. 212 (1988). The former
United States Court of Claims viewed the duty of consistency expansively. See, e.g., Hess v.
United States, 537 F.2d 457, 462-64 (Ct. CI. 1976). The appellate jurisdiction of the former
Court of Claims is now vested in the United States Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit. 28
U.S.C. § 1295 (1988).
35 For example, the Tenth Circuit has vacillated in this regard. Compare Continental Oil
Co. v. Jones, 177 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir. 1949) with Doneghy v. Alexander, 118 F,2d 521,
524 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 621 (1941).
The Fifth Circuit has authored the greatest number of opinions taking an expansive view of
the duty of consistency. However, even in that court, echoes of the equitable estoppel elements
have been heard. Compare Orange Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir.
1942) (rejecting the equitable estoppel distinction that only misstatement of fact will support
preclusion and that mistake of law will not) with Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755,
758 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1065 (1989) and Commissioner v. Dallas Title &
Guar. Co., 119 F.2d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1941) (both accepting that distinction). The Eleventh
Circuit, formed out of the old Fifth Circuit in 1981, follows the latter's position as to the duty
of consistency. See Shook v. United States, 713 F.2d 662, 666-67 (1 Ith Cir. 1983).
36 64-2 U.S.T.C. 9720 (S.D.W. Va. 1964).
37 Id. at 93,838.
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A decade later, in Beltzer v. United States,38 the Eighth Circuit
adopted the McMillan formulation virtually without change. Bearing
the imprimatur of a circuit court, the triune standard made substantial
headway. No court has overtly rejected it, and many have adopted it.39
Nevertheless, uncertainty persists. At first, one might think that the
three enumerated elements express the entire consistency doctrine, that
they are the only elements that need to be taken into account under this
formulation. The Beltzer district court adopted this view, for it described
the three elements as the "sole" requirements for application of the con-
sistency duty.40 Most courts, however, do not agree. They have freely
added elements to the consistency analysis. 41
In reality, the triune standard is not independent of the estoppel-ele-
ments-incorporation view and the expansive view. The easy acceptance
the formulation has enjoyed is attributable to the fact that it is equally
capable of adoption by an incorporationist court or an expansive court.42
Widespread acceptance of the triune standard creates a false perception
of harmony. The tension between the incorporationist view and the ex-
pansive view continues on a less obvious level.
E. Cases Treating the Consistency Duty as an Adjunct to the Tax
Benefit Rule
Generally, the tax benefit rule provides that, when a taxpayer receives
a tax benefit from a deduction in one year and recovers the amount in a
later year, she must include that recovery in income for the later year.43
The Tax Court and some other courts recognize an "erroneous deduction
exception" under which the tax benefit rule applies only if the deduction
was legally proper in the year taken." In 1971, in Mayfair Minerals, the
Tax Court established the duty of consistency as an exception to the erro-
38 495 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'g 73-2 U.S.T.C. 9512 (D. Neb. 1973).
39 E.g., Kielmar v. Commissioner, 884 F.2d 959, 965 (7th Cir. 1989); Herrington, 854 F.2d
at 758; Hess v. United States, 537 F.2d 457, 463 (Ct. CL 1976); Johnston v. United States, 605
F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mont. 1984); Unvert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 807, 815 (1979), aff'd on
other grounds, 656 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982).
40 Beltzer, 73-2 U.S.T.C. 9512, at 81,620-21.
41 E.g., Shook v. United States, 713 F.2d 662, 667 (11th Cir. 1983); Garner v. Commis-
sioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1181, 1187 (1981).
42 For example, Beltzer and McMillan, the original cases, seemed to differ as to the role of
the equitable estoppel factors, the Beltzer court seeming to take an incorporationist view,
Beltzer, 495 F.2d at 213, while McMillan evinced an expansive spirit, McMillan v. United
States, 64-2 U.S.T.C. 9720, at 93,838-39 (1964).
43 IRC § 111; e.g., Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 503 (1943).
44 E.g., Twitchco, Inc. v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 330, 335 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Kingsbury
v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1068, 1087-88 (1976). But see, e.g., Unvert v. Commissioner, 656
F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982).
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neous deduction exception.45 When the elements of the duty of consis-
tency are present, the Tax Court has required the inclusion of the
recovery item in income under the tax benefit rule even though the origi-
nal deduction was clearly improper.
This variant has greater significance for the tax benefit rule than for
the duty of consistency. The variant neither addresses the circumstances
that must be present to trigger application of the consistency duty, nor
enlarges or contracts the reach of the duty. Certainly, Mayfair Minerals
and similar decisions do not state that the Tax Court views the consis-
tency doctrine as operating exclusively in the context of erroneous deduc-
tions under the tax benefit rule.46 Accordingly, this view of the duty of
consistency is interesting, not so much because of its effect on the duty
per se, but rather because it raises the question of the proper relationship
of the duty to other doctrines used to promote overall coherence in the
tax treatment of transactions with multi-year effects.
In summary, the taxpayer duty of consistency, an alloy of many differ-
ent items, some legal and some equitable in nature, has emerged as a rule
of procedural tax law independent of its forerunners. In the decades
since its debut, five main views interpreting the duty have been pro-
pounded. These views pose three policy questions: (1) Should such a
duty be required of taxpayers in any form? (2) If so, what are the appro-
priate contours of the duty? (3) What should be the relationship of the
duty to other means of enforcing consistent tax reporting? These ques-
tions are answered in the following sections.
III. DESIRABILITY OF REQUIRING SOME DUTY OF CONSISTENCY
This article argues that a taxpayer duty of consistency promotes sub-
stantial policy values and is a valuable component of our tax system.
Specifically, the duty of consistency (1) buttresses the self-reporting sys-
tem, (2) fosters finality and repose and (3) facilitates the determination of
correct tax liability.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that in emphasizing these policy val-
ues this article attempts to put the duty of consistency on a new basis.
As previously noted, the duty of consistency originally was driven princi-
pally by a moral consideration: the perception that taxpayers taking in-
consistent positions obtain unfair advantage. While that sentiment is
entirely understandable, lashing the duty of consistency to mainly moral
moorings creates substantial difficulties. Accordingly, the following
analysis rests the duty on a foundation of practical policy values impor-
45 Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, aff'd per curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th
Cir. 1972); see also Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 558-61 (1980).
46 See e.g., Stoecklin v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 452, 459.60 (1987) (double deduc-
tion); Church v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1236, 1240 (1978) (basis of property).
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tant to the tax system. Ultimately, this is a more satisfactory basis than
the moralistic impulses animating the prior consistency cases.
A. Contribution to the Self-Reporting System
Self-reporting is the bedrock of our system of taxation4 7 as revenue
statistics amply demonstrate.4 Since the tax revenues collected by the
government overwhelmingly are the amounts reported by taxpayers on
their returns, maintaining and strengthening accurate self-reporting must
be of central concern.
The presence of a consistency obligation buttresses accurate self-re-
porting in two ways. First, it reduces the temptation to engage in calcu-
lated inconsistency and manipulation of the statute of limitations. A
taxpayer who realizes that he cannot benefit from his inconsistency has a
diminished incentive to "fudge." This buttresses self-reporting by dis-
couraging disingenuous reporting.
Second, a consistency obligation bolsters confidence in the fairness of
the system. Public suspicion that honest taxpayers are "suckers," that is,
shouldering their fair share of the cost of operating the nation's govern-
ment, while other taxpayers escape properly owed taxes by manipulating
the system, is potentially devastating to self-reporting. 49 The addition of
§§ 56(f) and (g) in 1986 provides a parallel.50 Previously, burgeoning
profitability of corporations reflected in their shareholder reports con-
trasted sharply with the apparent penury suggested by their tax returns.
This spectacle bred public cynicism about the accuracy of corporate re-
turns and public suspicion that corporations were avoiding taxes. Sec-
tion 56 was amended to reduce the inconsistency between financial and
tax reporting, thus fortifying public confidence in the fairness of the sys-
tem.51 The duty of consistency addresses game-playing between returns
much as amended § 56 addresses game-playing between returns and
shareholder reports.
Thus, preventing taxpayers from reaping tax advantage by shifting
characterizations of transactions, the consistency doctrine can help both
47 See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683 (1983); Flom v. United States, 362
U.S. 145, 176 (1960); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938); 26 C.F.R. § 601.103(a)
(1991).
48 "In 1990, taxpayers filed more than 200 million tax returns and paid over S1 trillion. IRS
enforcement efforts added another S51 billion. The difference between the amounts is a mea-
sure of voluntary compliance." Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Internal
Revenue Service Highlights 1980, at 5 (1991).
49 Curbing such suspicion and restoring public confidence in the tax system were important
objectives of the historic tax reforms of 1986. See, e.g., The President's Tax Proposals to the
Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity 1, 2 (1985).
50 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L 99-514, § 701(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2326-33.
51 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, at 433, 434-35 (Comm. Print 1987).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1991]
TAX LAW REVIEW
to deter individual abuse of self-reporting and to preserve the public con-
fidence essential to the self-reporting system.
B. Contribution to Finality and Repose
A value long embedded in our legal system is that, at some point, par-
ties should be confident that the legal consequences of a transaction are
fixed. Statutes of limitations embody this value. Each such statute states
the point in time at which the legislature believes the benefits of finality
and repose outweigh the benefit of correcting possibly erroneous charac-
terizations of transactions.
As noted in the previous section, one of the principal objections inter-
posed by courts rejecting any taxpayer consistency duty has been that the
duty would traduce the statute of limitations on assessment of tax under-
payments. 52 These courts reason that it is the Service's responsibility to
root out taxpayer errors within the limitations period. If the Service fails
to do so, it should not be permitted to recoup the loss by alleging tax-
payer inconsistency. To do so, according to these courts, would be, in
effect, to collect the earlier, barred taxes in the later, open tax period,
making an end run around the statute of limitations.5 3
The objection is unsound, however. The consistency doctrine merely
allows facts deemed to have been established in a closed tax period to be
used in determining tax liability in an open tax period. There is no viola-
tion of the statute of limitations because the assessment is made only
with respect to the open period.54
More fundamentally, the duty of consistency actually promotes, rather
than derogates, the values of finality and repose expressed in the statute
of limitations. It is the opponent of the consistency rule, not its propo-
nent, who seeks to disturb the finality of the prior transactions. In insist-
ing on consistency, the government argues for taking the prior period
returns at face value and treating the characterizations on those returns
as final. In demanding liberty from his prior returns, the inconsistent
taxpayer is the party exhuming characterizations and representations
that otherwise would have been at rest.55
52 See IRC § 6501 (current statute of limitations on assessments).
53 E.g., Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483, 494 (Ist Cir. 1948); Kenosha Auto Transp.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 421, 425 (1957).
54 See, e.g., Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1065 (1989); Wentworth v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1210, 1213 (1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d
874 (9th Cir. 1957).
55 See, e.g., McMillan v. United States, 64-2 U.S.T.C. % 9720, at 93,839 (S.D.W. Va. 1964)
(absent duty of consistency "there would be no finality to the tax determinations" in many
cases); Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 86 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 456
F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972).
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C. Contribution to Determination of Correct Tax Liability
To correctly determine a taxpayer's deficiency or overpayment, a court
first must select an appropriate rule of liability, and then must accurately
ascertain the facts of the particular case so as to apply the rule. There-
fore, in determining the extent of the duty of consistency, alternatives
should be evaluated in part as to whether they yield sound rules of liabil-
ity and whether they advance or impede accuracy in factfinding. As
shown below, a tax system which requires some duty of consistency is
superior in both of these respects to one that does not.
An important theoretical question lurks in the apparently straightfor-
ward observation that correct tax liability should be determined: Is the
paradigm of correctness based only on the open tax year, or is it based on
the transaction taken as a whole including all of its multi-year effects?
If the first basis is preferable, it is inappropriate to impose a duty of
consistency. As a general matter, tax liabilities are determined on an
annual or other periodic basis, and each period is a separate taxable pe-
riod.56 The duty of consistency precludes the taxpayer from shifting his
position with respect to a transaction with multi-year effects even if that
position is factually or legally incorrect. It thus can project the error of
the closed year into the open year, potentially rendering inaccurate the
tax liability determined by the court for the subsequent year. For this
reason, a number of decisions rejected the duty of consistency as incom-
patible with the policy of periodic determination of tax liability.57
The counter argument, however, is more persuasive. We employ peri-
odic reporting because of ease of administration, not because it is the
only correct way to tabulate tax accounts. The periodic reporting system
is not sacrosanct, and it often yields to exigent circumstances. 58 The
anti-consistency view achieves correctness as to the open year at the ex-
pense of great inaccuracy with regard to the whole transaction. The tax-
payer who improperly reduced her tax in the closed period is allowed to
retain that benefit in the open period with the result that the government
receives less revenue than Congress intended.
In contrast, the consistency rule, by holding the taxpayer to her origi-
nal position, allows the government to recover in the open period at least
part of the revenue it was deprived of in the closed period.59 In this case,
56 E.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948).
57 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Mnookin's Estate, 184 F.2d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1950); Countway
v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 1942).
58 IRC §§ 111, 172, 381-384, 481, 1212, 1311-1314 and 1341 all are modifications of the
annual reporting system in the income tax area, as were the income averaging rules of former
§§ 1301-1305.
59 The correction is not exact. Because of a variety of factors-including tax rate, tax
bracket differentials and time value of money considerations-rarely will the economic value
of the amount recovered in the open year equal the economic value of the amount underpaid in
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two wrongs do make a right--or, at least, two partially offsetting wrongs
(pro-taxpayer error in the closed period and pro-government error in the
open period) come closer to the overall correct incidence of tax than do
one wrong and one right. 6° An approximation of the tax consequences of
the transaction as a whole is preferable to verisimilitude of tax conse-
quences as to only the open half of the transaction.61 Thus, the rough
transactional accuracy fostered by a duty of consistency is a better liabil-
ity principle than the tunnel vision insistence on periodic reporting which
marks the anti-consistency view.
The anti-consistency view also is vulnerable with regard to the
factfinding it requires. Because the duty of consistency binds a taxpayer
to his prior representation regardless of its correctness as a matter of
substantive tax law, a pro-consistency court need not determine the accu-
racy of the taxpayer's prior representation. Since an anti-consistency
court will not hold the taxpayer to her prior representation, it must re-
ceive and evaluate evidence as to whether the original characterization
was correct in order to reach a determination as to the open year. For
example, if the Service asserts that an item was includable in the tax-
payer's income for 1991 and the taxpayer rejoins that it actually was
includable in his income for 1981 (even though he did not report it on his
1981 return), the anti-consistency court will have to consider evidence to
determine whether 1981 was the proper year for inclusion.
This creates a practical factfinding problem. What if the factual rec-
ord for 1981 is incomplete or unreliable? The closed and open years
often are separated by a decade or more,62 and during that interval docu-
ments can be lost, memories can fade and witnesses can die or disappear.
The anti-consistency rule might require the court to decide the question
based on stale and incomplete evidence. 63 Because a reliable decision
requires an accurate record, the ability of an anti-consistency court to
achieve accuracy even as to the open year is likely to be limited as a
practical matter.
the closed year. See, e.g., Bennet v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 537, 538 (2d Cir. 1943). Nonetheless,
from a revenue standpoint, imperfect correction is preferable to no correction at all.
60 See Louis A. Del Cotto & Kenneth F. Joyce, Double Benefits and Transactional Consis-
tency Under the Tax Benefit Rule, 39 Tax L. Rev. 473, 476-77 (1984), for examples of how
double tax savings, if uncorrected, distort a taxpayer's true economic gain.
61 See, e.g., Orange Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 1942); Buras v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1311, 1314 (1977). The policy preference argued for here
also has been recognized in the context of the tax benefit rule. See, e.g., Hillsboro Nat'l Bank
v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983); Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663,
678 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
62 See, e.g., Building Syndicate Co. v. United States, 292 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1961) (1927 and
1943); Tennessee Prods. Corp. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 578 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (1917 and
1939 through 1941); Cleveland-Sandusky Brewing Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 539 (1958)
(1918 and 1950).
63 E.g., Bartel v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 25, 32 (1970).
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In summary, the duty of consistency contributes directly to several
major policy goals: It bolsters the self-reporting system; it protects final-
ity and repose; and it facilitates the determination of correct tax liability
both by providing a superior liability principle and by minimizing
factfinding inaccuracies. Accordingly, the threshold question-"Should
a duty of consistency be required of taxpayers?"-should be answered in
the affirmative.
IV. APPROPRIATE CONTOUns OF THE DUTY OF CONSISTENCY
This section advances a detailed reformulation of the taxpayer duty of
consistency. Heuristically, it is profitable to compare the elements of this
reformulation with those of the McMillan/Beltzer version of the duty
since that version has been widely adopted, at least nominally. 64 While
some aspects of the McMillan/Beltzer approach are valuable, substantial
doctrinal departures and clarifications are required.
Under McMillan/leltzer, the duty of consistency prevents a taxpayer
from shifting position if the following three elements exist:
(1) The taxpayer has made a representation of fact or reported
an item for tax purposes in one tax year;
(2) The Service has acquiesced in or relied on that fact for that
year;
(3) The taxpayer desires to change the representation, previ-
ously made, in a later tax year after the first year has been
closed by the statute of limitations. 65
To ease the transition from this familiar version, the reformulation
borrows the triune format, mingling familiar and new elements. Specifi-
cally, this article advocates that the duty of consistency should prevent a
taxpayer from shifting position if the following three elements exist:
(1) The taxpayer or a sufficiently related person made a written
representation to the Service regarding an item in one tax
period;
(2) The taxpayer desires to change the representation, previ-
ously made, at a time when correction of the previous rep-
resentation effectively would be prevented by the statute of
limitations;
(3) The taxpayer fails to establish the existence of any specified
affirmative defense to the duty of consistency.
64 See text accompanying notes 36-42.
65 McNfillan v. United States, 64-2 U.S.T.C. 9720, at 93,838 (S.D.W. Va. 1964); see also
Beltzer v. United States, 495 F.2d 211, 212 (8th Cir. 1974).
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The advantages of the reformulation over the old standard are evalu-
ated below on an element-by-element basis.
A. Taxpayer's Representation
The reformulation of the first element substitutes "in one tax period"
for McMillan/Beltzer's "in one tax year" to clarify that the duty of con-
sistency also applies to taxes calculated on other than an annual basis. In
addition, there are four other differences which require fuller explication.
They relate to: (1) consistency privity, i.e., when the taxpayer should be
bound by a prior representation made by a person related to him; (2) the
types of prior representations to which a taxpayer should be bound; (3)
the requirement that the representation be written; and (4) the require-
ment that the representation be made to the Service.
1. Consistency Privity
Although the triune standard and other consistency cases state that
the taxpayer is bound by her prior representations, there is a broader
preclusive effect. In practice, "prior representation of the taxpayer" has
been understood to mean "prior representation of the taxpayer or a suffi-
ciently related person." The reformulation makes that understanding
explicit.
Moreover, the proposal strives for greater coherence than that thus far
exhibited by the consistency case law dealing with related party represen-
tations. The disarray in this area stems in part from a line of cases inter-
preting an opinion of the Court of Claims. In Ford v. United States,66 the
court refused to require beneficiaries to use as their basis in inherited
stock the value used by the executor on the estate tax return. The dece-
dent and the beneficiaries-his minor children-lived in Brazil. In re-
jecting the Service's position, the court referred to the children's age, as
well as to their lack of knowledge. 67
It is hard to derive a general principle from Ford. Reading the case
broadly, post-Ford taxpayers argued that a taxpayer could not be bound
by a prior representation unless he had participated personally in making
that representation. That proposition met with varying judicial reac-
tions. Four years after Ford, the McMillan court was patently unim-
pressed by the broad reading of Ford or even by Ford itself, suggesting
that it be limited to its facts.68 Other cases, although distinguishing Ford,
66 276 F.2d 17 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
67 Id. at 22 ("In the instant case, the plaintiffs were, respectively, 15 and 12 years of age at
the time of their father's death. They resided in Brazil and of course had no knowledge of
what was being written in their father's estate tax return in the United States.").
68 McMillan, 64-2 U.S.T.C. at 93,839.
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implied that the case, as well as the broad "nonparticipation" interpreta-
tion of it, might have validity.6 9
Sixteen years after Ford, however, the Court of Claims limited its own
precedent. Hess v. United States70 involved the same core question:
Does the basis of stock for income tax purposes have to be limited to the
fair market value of that stock as reported on an estate tax return? The
court held that under the duty of consistency the beneficiaries were re-
quired to use the estate tax value because the interests of the beneficiaries
and the estate were "very closely related. ' 71 The court acknowledged
Ford, but ignored the facts that the Hess beneficiaries were also minors at
the time of the estate tax representation and were not personally involved
in it.72 Although Hess therefore seems to have overruled Ford de facto, it
remains to be seen whether Ford will survive as an influence on courts.
These cases and others7" send mixed signals as to the dimensions of
consistency privity. The value of predictability would be served by defin-
ing "sufficiently related person" with greater clarity. Two polar ap-
proaches-the flexible and the formal-are available. The greatest
flexibility would result if the court applied the duty of consistency when-
ever substantial operational interaction or commonality of economic in-
terest exists between the taxpayer and the other person. Hess took this
approach in its statement that the taxpayers and the trusts were "very
closely related." 74 A comparable level of generality operates under
§ 482, which allows the Service to reallocate tax attributes between enti-
ties which are "owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests." 75 However, Ford and its successors inspire caution. Granting
so general a mandate to the courts inevitably would produce many irrec-
oncilable decisions.
69 See, e.g., Belizer, 495 F.2d at 213; Griffith v. United States, 71-1 U.S.T.C. 9280, at
86,085 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
70 537 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
71 Id. at 464.
72 As the dissent noted, the majority gave "only lip service" to Ford. Id. at 465 (Kunzig, J.,
dissenting).
73 For example, many decisions have held that a transferee is bound by prior representa-
tions made by his transferor. E.g., Interlochen Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 873, 877 (4th
Cir. 1956); Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 486 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 650 (1940). But see Fahs v. Florida Mach. & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957, 959 (5th Cir.
1948).
Other cases in the area of consistency privity include Hancock Bank v. United States, 254
F. Supp. 206, 208 (S.D. Miss. 1966) (estate bound by representations of its decedent), aff'd on
other grounds, 400 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1968); Spruance v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 141, 156
(1973) (representations made by a person acting in a fiduciary capacity do not bind that person
when acting in her personal capacity).
74 Hess, 537 F.2d at 464.
75 This language was intended to be applied flexibly with an eye to the practical realities of
control rather than to the formalities of relationships. See, eg., B. Foreman Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 453 F.2d 1144, 1153 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972).
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This problem would be curbed under a formal approach, that is, one in
which "sufficiently close relationships" are specifically and exclusively
enumerated. Of course, there is no shortage of similar enumerations
under the Code. 76 Unfortunately, none of these enumerations is broad
enough to encompass all the relationships that have been found sufficient
to trigger consistency adjustments in the reported cases. For example,
the § 267(b) relationships omit estates and their decedents, fiduciaries
and beneficiaries, which are prominent relationships in consistency case
law. 77 In like fashion, the § 1313(c) rules do not extend to any family
relationship other than spousal, 78 and they do not relate to estates and
trusts when these entities have common beneficiaries. 79
Since both of the polar approaches are problematic, this article pro-
poses that they be used conjunctively. The taxpayer should be bound to
the prior representation of another person whenever there exists between
them substantial operational interaction or commonality of economic in-
terests. Without limitation, this test will be held to be met whenever any
relationship enumerated in any Code section defining attribution or re-
lated party status exists. The second portion of the test obviates the pos-
sibility that a court (like the Ford court) will disregard the essential
identity of interests between the taxpayer and the related party. The first
portion serves as a backstop against the unlikely event that a case to
which the duty of consistency should be applied will slip through the
cracks due to the absence of an enumerated relationship.
2. Representations to Which Taxpayer Should Be Bound
In detailing the types of prior representations to which a taxpayer
should be bound, the reformulation substitutes "made a representation"
for the McMillan/Beltzer language "made a representation of fact or re-
ported an item." Three aspects of the substitution are significant. Under
the reformulation, (1) the prior representation need not be one "of fact;"
(2) the prior representation need not be on a tax return; and (3) under
appropriate circumstances, an omission can constitute a representation.
The proposal discards the notion that the duty of consistency operates
only if the representation made by the taxpayer or related person as to
the closed year was a representation of fact. The "fact versus law" dis-
tinction is one of the culpability-based factors borrowed from the doc-
76 See, e.g., IRC §§ 52, 267(b), (c), 318, 465(b)(3)(C), 382(1)(3)(A), 503(b), 707(b), 1313(c),
1504(a), 1563(a), (b), (d) & (e), 6901(a)(1); see also Reg. § 301.6402-2(e).
77 See, e.g., Griffith v. United States, 71-1 U.S.T.C. 9280 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Church v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1236 (1978).
78 IRC § 1313(c)(1).
79 See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 361, 370-72 (1956), aff'd on other grounds,
258 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1958).
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trine of equitable estoppel. As is argued in Section IV.B, those factors in
general and the "fact versus law" distinction in particular do more harm
than good and should be eliminated.
The proposal also makes clear that representations are not limited to
those made on a return. Although preceded by a disjunctive, the "re-
ported an item for tax purposes" language of McMillan/Beltzer may give
the impression that the duty of consistency operates only with respect to
return representations. This is inaccurate. Although the great majority
of consistency cases involve representations made on tax returns, not all
do. Other representations also have given rise to consistency controver-
sies.8o The reformulation confirms those cases and the principle that rep-
resentations not made on a return can be operative for duty of
consistency purposes.
The reformulation also clarifies that an omission can be a representa-
tion. There are two principal ways a taxpayer can omit an income item
from his return for a given year: He could write "zero" on the appropri-
ate lines on the return or he could leave those lines blank. Curiously, to
some courts, the taxpayer's choice might make a difference for consis-
tency purposes. A number of decisions have held or implied that an
omission cannot constitute a representation for duty of consistency pur-
poses."' Under such a rule, the duty of consistency presumably would
require an inconsistent taxpayer to include the income in a later year if
he wrote "zero" on the appropriate lines on his return, but would not
require such inclusion if he simply left those lines blank.
Such divergent results are unsupportable, and the preponderance of
the cases hold that an omission can constitute an implied representation
which, under the duty of consistency, a taxpayer cannot subsequently
repudiate.8 2 However, this should be the case only when the taxpayer or
related person had an affirmative duty to disclose the item. The obvious
example would be a tax return, which is made under oath. This ap-
90 The most recent example is Griffith v. Commissioner, in which the taxpayer was held to
representations in consent forms executed by an unauthorized agent. 56 T.C.ML (CCH0 220,
226 (1988), further proceedings, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1263 (1989); see also R.H. Stearns Co. v.
United States, 291 U.S. 54 (1934); LX Cattle Co. v. United States, 79-1 U.S.T.C. 9282 (N.D.
Tex. 1979); Erickson v. United States, 309 F.2d 760 (Ct. CL 1962); Sabine Royalty Corp. v.
Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1071 (1951).
81 See, e.g., Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483, 496 (lst Cir. 1948); Louis Werner Saw
Mill Co. v. Helvering, 96 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Manhattan Bldg. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 27 T.C. 1032, 1043 (1957).
82 E.g., Wentworth v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1957); Doneghy v. Alex-
ander, 118 F.2d 521, 524 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 621 (1941); Portland Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 485 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
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proach is consonant with a number of reported consistency opinions3
and is supported by several aspects of the nontax law.8 4
Clifton Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner"5 illuminates this princi-
ple. In that case, although one of the taxpayer's customers was obligated
during 1934 to pay interest to the taxpayer, it did not make the payment
because it was in serious financial straits. The debtor paid the 1934 debt
in 1937. The taxpayer, which was on the accrual method of accounting,
did not report the interest as income on its 1934 return, or on any subse-
quent return. The Service asserted that the interest should be included in
1937 as the prior years were closed under the statute of limitations. The
circuit court refused to apply the duty of consistency on the ground that
the taxpayer had made no inconsistent representations. Instead, in the
court's view, throughout the litigation, the taxpayer maintained only one
position: The item was properly accruable in 1934.86
Under the standards proposed in this article, the court's decision does
not withstand scrutiny. Since an accrual method taxpayer is obligated to
report all income accrued during the year on its return for that year, the
taxpayer's omission of the interest from its 1934 return was an implied
representation that it had not accrued in 1934. When the taxpayer later
attempted to defeat the 1937 adjustment by contending that the interest
had accrued in 1934, it contradicted its prior implied representation.
The court's error in Clifton Manufacturing was its failure to realize that
an omission can be (and in that case should have been) an actionable
representation for duty of consistency purposes.
3. Requirement that the Representation Be in Writing
The suggestion that duty of consistency adjustments can be founded
on representations other than those on a tax return has potential difficul-
ties. First, is the issue of proof of the prior representation. Human per-
ception and recall being notoriously fallible, how are we to be sure that
the prior representation was to the effect now alleged? Second, there is a
potential problem as to the seriousness of the prior representation. The
83 E.g., Countway v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 69, 76 (lst Cir. 1942); Stewart v. United
States, 100 F. Supp. 221, 226-27 (D. Neb. 1951). In Commissioner v. Arnold, the taxpayer
was a nonresident alien and was not required to file a return. 147 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1945).
The court held that the taxpayer's failure to report an item was not an omission rising to the
level of an implied representation. Id. Since the taxpayer was under no legal duty to speak,
the reformulation proposed here would reach the same result.
84 It is hornbook law that omissions as well as commissions can give rise to tort liability and
even to criminal liability. This is the case when the defendant was under a legal duty to per-
form a given act but failed, without adequate defense, to perform it. See, e.g., 21 Am. Jur. 2d
Criminal Law § 36 (1981); 74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 11 (1974).
85 137 F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1943), rev'g 1 T.C. 71 (1942).
86 137 F.2d at 293.
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rule should not place taxpayers at hazard for every utterance, no matter
how casual and ill-considered. The prior representation must be of such
a level of gravity that we feel comfortable rendering it immutable.
At least formally, the old triune standard has no safeguard against the
above concerns. The reformulation addresses them by requiring that the
representation be in writing.87 A written representation obviously is su-
perior to an oral representation from the standpoint of certainty. More-
over, the taxpayer should be expected to be in a serious state of mind
when he submits a written communication to the Service with respect to
his tax liabilities.
4. Requirement that Representation Be Made to the Service
The taxpayer should not be bound by every written statement the Ser-
vice obtains regardless of to whom the statement was made. For exam-
ple, the taxpayer may submit a financial statement to a potential lender
which asserts ownership of a given asset and lists its value. If ownership
or value were at issue in a later tax controversy and the Service obtained
a copy of the financial statement, that statement undoubtedly would be
admissible evidence. The duty of consistency, however, should not pre-
clude the taxpayer from offering other evidence on the issue that is con-
trary to the financial statement.
This result is clearer under the reformulation than it is under the tri-
une standard. In some cases, the Service has argued that the duty of
consistency binds the taxpayer to a statement contained in its books and
records 88 McMillan/Reltzer requires that the representation be "for tax
purposes." Since one important reason a business maintains books and
records is to permit it to prepare accurate tax returns, the government
might be able to argue that a statement in corporate books and records is
a statement "for tax purposes," within the letter of McMillan/Beltzer. In
contrast, under the reformulation, the statement must be made to the
Service. 9 Although the Service may ask to see business books and
records, they are not prepared for the IRS. Thus, statements in a tax-
87 In Tennessee Prods. Corp. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 578 (Ct. Cl 1952), the taxpayer
made oral statements to a revenue agent with respect to one audit cycle. The Service argued
that the duty of consistency bound the taxpayer to that representation in later years. The
court (although on different grounds) disagreed. Because the proposed rule requires that the
taxpayer's prior representation be in writing, it would cover the Tennessce Products result.
88 See, e.g., McCulloch Corp. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CC-) 802, 809-10 (1984);
Deviney Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 413, 414 (1977).
89 The reformulation would ratify the result in Shook v. United States, 713 F.2d 662 (11th
Cir. 1983). In that case, the taxpayer's representative wrote a letter to the taxpayer, and the
Service asserted that the duty of consistency bound the taxpayer to the statements in that
letter. Because the letter was not sent to the Service, the circuit court's decision against the
government was appropriate. Id. at 662.
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payer's books and records would not be prior representations which it
could not, under the duty of consistency, attempt later to deny.
B. Commissioner's Reliance
The proposal eliminates the second element of the old triune standard
which required the Commissioner's acquiescence in or reliance on the
taxpayer's representation of fact. This element provides an unfortunate
opportunity to apply two of the traditional equitable estoppel factors.
The "acquiescence or reliance" language invites the court to consider
whether the Service had actual or constructive knowledge of the facts.
Similarly, the reference to "fact" opens the door to the "representation of
fact versus representation of law" dichotomy. As suggested below, it is
desirable to remove these and other equitable estoppel factors from con-
sistency analysis.
At the outset, it is useful to divide the traditional equitable estoppel
elements into two categories: Some elements relate to the fact that a
harm or detriment has occurred; other elements seek to assign responsi-
bility for that result to one or the other of the litigants. Five elements of
the second kind-those seeking to measure the relative degrees of culpa-
bility of the taxpayer and the Service-have appeared in consistency de-
cisions. They are: (1) whether the taxpayer's initial representation was
made with an intent to mislead or deceive the Service;90 (2) whether the
taxpayer had knowledge of the true facts when he made his initial repre-
sentation;91 (3) whether the Service had adequate knowledge of the facts,
or opportunity to gain such knowledge, before the statute of limitations
expired as to the year of the initial representation; 92 (4) whether the tax-
payer's initial representation was one of fact or one of law;93 and (5)
whether the error resulted from the taxpayer's unilateral action or from a
mutual mistake of the taxpayer and the Service. 94
This article advocates the excision of these culpability-based estoppel
factors from consistency analysis. The incorporation of these elements is
conceptually anomalous, is founded on an unsatisfactory model of tax
administration and creates an unacceptable degree of unpredictability.
90 E.g., Cleveland-Sandusky Brewing Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 539, 544-45 (1958);
Grauman's Greater Hollywood Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 448, 449 (1938).
9' E.g., Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376, 380-81 (6th Cir. 1956); Van Antwerp
v. United States, 92 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1937).
92 E.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 560 (1980); Atlas Oil &
Ref. Corp. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 552, 560 (1954).
93 E.g., Joplin Bros. Mobile Homes, Inc. v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 800, 803 (W.D. Mo.
1981); United States v. Du Pont, 47 F. Supp. 894, 897 (D. Del. 1942).
94 E.g., Manhattan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 1032, 1042 (1957); Capital Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1202, 1209-10 (1951).
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First, conceptually, after hundreds of consistency decisions over 60
years, it is too late to deny that the duty of consistency is a doctrine of
law discrete from the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Even courts that
import estoppel elements into the duty of consistency admit this proposi-
tion.95 Incorporationism, however, cannot be reconciled with the dis-
creteness of the two doctrines. If the duty of consistency applies to a case
only if all the elements of equitable estoppel are present, the government
could never win a case on consistency grounds that it could not win on
estoppel grounds. Thus, those cases that acknowledge the separateness
of the doctrines, but conflate them by conditioning application of one on
satisfaction of the elements of the other, contradict in practice what they
assert in theory. Furthermore, the merger of the doctrines is difficult to
defend historically. While equitable estoppel undoubtedly was one of the
sources of the consistency duty, it was neither the sole source nor even
the major one.96 Thus, it is difficult to hinge the duty upon satisfaction of
the elements of equitable estoppel.
Second, culpability-based factors do not comport well with a satisfac-
tory model of tax administration. In a private lawsuit, it may be sensible
for the court to ask which party behaved less laudably and make its es-
toppel rulings on that basis. That bipolar model, however, does not work
well in suits involving revenue. Tax cases are not private affairs between
the taxpayer and the Service alone; the citizenry has a stake in these
cases. 97 Thus, when a taxpayer who has underpaid his taxes is allowed to
avoid a consistency adjustment because the Service has operated laxly,
the Service is not the only loser. The hypersensitivity of these factors in
assessing the relative blameworthiness of the two visible parties ignores
the interests of the invisible, but crucial, third party.
Finally, incorporation of culpability-based factors undercuts predict-
ability. Predictability in law is a function of definable principles. How-
ever, moralistic decisionmaking, which is the inevitable result of factors
that require the court to evaluate the relative culpabilities of the parties,
rarely yields precise analysis or definition. Such decisions are more con-
cerned with punishing or rewarding the litigants before the court than
with marking boundaries for those who come later.
95 See, e.g., Crosley, 229 F.2d at 380-81; Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483, 493-96 (lst
Cir. 1948).
96 Hess v. United States, 537 F.2d 457, 462 (Ct. CI. 1976) (the duty of consistency "is not
merely an equitable defense, such as the word 'estoppel' normally denotes ... but [is] more in
the nature of a legal defense"); Comar Oil Co. v. Helvering, 107 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1939)
(duty of consistency based upon an entirely different ground from equitable estoppel).
97 Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., Tax Court Trials: A View from the Bench, 59 A.B.A. J. 295,
295 (1973) ("[U]nlike the ordinary tort or contract case, the other real party in interest is the
taxpaying public. If the taxpayer gets off the hook for what he really should be required to
pay, the pockets of all have been depleted.").
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The ambiguities introduced by the culpability-based factors operate at
three levels: (1) ambiguities as to which particular estoppel factors are to
be incorporated and which are not; (2) ambiguities as to the meaning of
individual factors; and (3) ambiguities as to the burden of proof with
respect to these factors.
The most fundamental ambiguity relates to whether all five of the cul-
pability-based estoppel factors are to be incorporated into consistency
doctrine and, if not, which of them are dispensable. Numerous cases
have held that the duty of consistency can apply "even though all the
technical elements of estoppel are not present."98 Other cases, however,
have held that all of the elements of equitable estoppel must be satisfied
before the duty of consistency can be applied, at least under some cir-
cumstances. 99 Furthermore, most cases stating that some of the estoppel
factors are, in theory, expendable have not enumerated the factors that
can be omitted, and the relatively few decisions achieving any degree of
specificity 1°  have engendered no consensus. These conflicting prece-
dents make prediction as to the outcome of a consistency case hazardous.
Unpredictability also arises from confusion as to the meaning of par-
ticular estoppel factors. The best example is the factor considering IRS
knowledge. It is unclear at what point the Service's actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the facts has reached the critical mass needed to dis-
qualify application of the duty of consistency. Although there are two
fairly settled points-(1) the Service is not compelled to audit the year of
the first representation; 10' and (2) if the Service audits the first year, it is
not required to hunt for information from sources beyond the tax-
payer' 2-little else is clear. Both the amount of knowledge required and
whether the knowledge may be constructive as well as actual vary greatly
from decision to decision.103 Thus, when the consistency issue turns on
the IRS knowledge factor, the outcome of the case is rarely predictable.
98 E.g., Interlochen Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 873, 877-78 (4th Cir. 1956); Continental
Oil Co. v. Jones, 177 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir. 1949).
99 E.g., Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376, 380 (6th Cir. 1956).
100 Wichita Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 152 F.2d 6, 8 (5th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 806 (1946) (intent to deceive element); Orange Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner,
131 F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 1942) (fact versus law element); Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Commis-
sioner, 36 B.T.A. 402, 404-05 (1937), aff'd, 95 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 577
(1938) (Service knowledge element).
101 Commissioner v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1932).
102 See, e.g., Lofquist Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 1939);
Robinson v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 847, 849-50 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 567 (1939).
103 Compare Erickson v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2073, 2077-78 (1991) (Service
deemed to have sufficient knowledge if exposed to key information in any fashion, whether or
not connected with audit of taxpayer for period of first representation) with Mayfair Minerals,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 91-93 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972)
(fortuitous exposure insufficient). The latter view is consistent with the refusal of courts in
other areas to hold the Service accountable for all information in any of its offices regardless of
how connected to or estranged from the particular taxpayer and tax years involved. See, e.g.,
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Uncertainty as to the meaning of other factors abounds as well. The
"fact versus law" element is predictable in its application only to the
extent that representations can be distinguished between fact and law.
While this will be possible in some cases, it will not be feasible in all. 104
Finally, the burden of proof rule is also unstable as it relates to the
culpability-based factors. Generally, it is held that the duty of consis-
tency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded and
proved by the government.10 5 To discharge its burden of proof, the gov-
ernment must affirmatively establish facts satisfying all the elements.
However, when the court finds that the taxpayer was the more blame-
worthy party, it occasionally ignores the fact that strict application of the
burden of proof to the culpability elements would yield a different result,
finding a way around the rule that the government must affirmatively
prove each element of the duty of consistency, including the incorporated
culpability-based estoppel elements.Y06 Conversely, when the court feels
that the Service's conduct was as bad or worse than the taxpayer's, it
sometimes will find failures of proof that, in fairness, are not presented by
the case. A court that dislikes the whole notion of the duty of consis-
tency often can find a way to phrase its opinion in burden of proof lan-
guage. 107 When a court either excuses failures of proof or finds proof
problems that are not present, the duty of consistency is rendered less
predictable in application. Such abuses are the natural result of the mor-
alistic flavor of the culpability-based factors.
Burdening the duty of consistency with the culpability-based factors of
equitable estoppel was an infelicitous importation. The approach is con-
ceptually anomalous, reflects an unsatisfactory model of tax administra-
tion and renders consistency doctrine largely unpredictable in practice.
Thus, these factors should be removed from consistency analysis.
O'Harren v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 20,22-23 (1990) (knowledge of misguided filing
not attributed to office where filing should have been made).
104 Tax return representations generally mix factual components and legal components, ren-
dering it difficult to confidently classify them purely as one type or the other.
105 E.g., Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106, 109 (1936); Barbados #7 Ltd. v. Commis-
sioner, 92 T.C. 804, 813 (1989); Kutsunai v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1179, 1182
(1983).
105 For example, in Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972)
(per curiam), the taxpayer contended that the duty of consistency did not apply becausc the
Service knew the true facts before expiration of the limitations period and because the parties
had made a mutual mistake of law. The court responded: "This argument fails for lack of
support in the record." Id. at 623. So put, the accepted burden of proof has b c n reversed.
See also Commissioner v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1932).
107 See, e.g., Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. Memo. Dec. f
36,244 (1936), aff'd per curiam, 93 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1937).
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C. Change in Representation
An element of the reformulation is that the "[tiaxpayer desires to
change the representation, previously made, at a time when correction of
the previous representation would be effectively prevented by the statute
of limitations." This element raises three issues: (1) What constitutes an
inconsistency or a change of a prior representation? (2) When can incon-
sistencies affecting only one tax period be corrected? and (3) When is
correction "effectively" prevented by the statute of limitations?
1. Inconsistency Defined
Although a concept of what renders representations inconsistent
would seem a prerequisite to the application of the duty of consistency,
there is no general definition of inconsistency. While a case-by-case ap-
proach may have caused no great harm in most instances, there are a
number of questionable results which could have been avoided with a
serviceable definition of inconsistency. A principal problem has been the
tendency of some decisions to treat inconsistency questions as an exercise
in linguistic literalism. The law would be served better by focusing on
the practical consequences of successive representations.
Thus, this article proposes the following standard: An inconsistent
representation is made whenever the basis on which the Service's current
adjustment is being resisted would, if accepted as correct, leave no satis-
factory ground on which a previous tax result claimed by the taxpayer
could be defended as having been correct.
The operational difference between the literal approach and the practi-
cal effect approach advocated here is illustrated by Sanders v. Commis-
sioner.108 The taxpayers had developed a scheme to manufacture
additional deductions for their closely held corporation. Each Decem-
ber, the corporation accrued bonuses to the taxpayers, who were employ-
ees as well as shareholders. In the succeeding March, the bonuses were
paid out by check which the recipients endorsed back to the corporation.
The bonuses were then credited to officer loan accounts on the corpora-
tion's books. The taxpayers later drew amounts against these accounts,
but did not include them in income. The officer loan accounts subse-
quently were closed out on the corporate books. 109
In the first round of litigation the taxpayers successfully argued that,
because the bonuses were shams, they should not be charged with salary
income in the year of payment even as to the amounts they withdrew
108 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 332 (1973). A previous round of litigation, Sanders & Sons, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 671 (1967), had involved some of the same issues for earlier
tax years.
109 Sanders, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) at 334-35.
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from the loan accounts. Since the Service did not argue that these
amounts were taxable as dividends, they escaped tax entirely in the ear-
lier years.' 10 The Service subsequently maintained that the amounts
withdrawn from the loan accounts constituted income to the taxpayers in
the year the loan accounts were closed out. The taxpayers defended on
the ground that these amounts were includable in income in the earlier
years, not in the year the accounts were closed. The Service asserted that
the duty of consistency precluded the taxpayers from taking that posi-
tion. The Tax Court held the duty inapplicable because, in its view, the
taxpayers had not made inconsistent representations. The court rea-
soned that, in the first round of litigation, the taxpayers had argued sim-
ply that the bonuses were not salary or compensation and neither side
had pursued the notion that the withdrawals were dividends.11
As to the duty of consistency issue, Sanders was wrongly decided. The
taxpayers had made two prior representations, not one: (1) They explic-
itly represented that the withdrawn amounts were not salary income in
the earlier years and (2) by omitting these amounts from their returns,
they implicitly represented that the withdrawals were not income of any
kind. The Sanders court tested the taxpayers' subsequent representation
against only the first of the two prior representations. It did not take into
account the fact that the taxpayers' subsequent representation-that the
withdrawn amounts were income in the earlier years-cannot be squared
with the implicit representation in their returns that the amounts were
not income of any kind in those years.
Under the standard advocated, Sanders would have been decided dif-
ferently. The position on which the Sanders taxpayers resisted the later
adjustment was that the income was includable in previous years. If so,
there would have been no satisfactory way to defend as correct the previ-
ous tax result claimed by the taxpayers, i.e., that the income not be in-
cluded in those years.
2. Inconsistency Affecting Only One Tax Period
Most duty of consistency cases involve inconsistencies involving two
or more tax periods, so much so that it often is convenient to speak of the
duty as aimed at multi-year discrepancies. Nevertheless, the doctrine
may apply to an intra-period inconsistency when the effect of permitting
that inconsistency would be to close the period to correction under the
statute of limitations. The reformulation reflects this by substituting "at
a time when correction of the previous representation would be effec-
tively prevented by the statute of limitations" for the language of the old
110 Id. at 336-37.
M Id. at 340-41.
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triune standard "in a later year after the first year has been closed by the
statute of limitations."
Griffith v. Commissioner1 12 is an example of inconsistent representa-
tions relating to one year. The taxpayer was represented during the audit
by an unenrolled return preparer who, at the taxpayer's request, executed
consents extending the statute of limitations for two years,113 despite the
fact that Service rules deny such power to an unenrolled preparer. 114
The Service determined deficiencies for those years. The taxpayer as-
serted that the consents were invalid because they had been signed by an
unenrolled preparer and thus the statutes of limitations had expired. 115
The court applied the duty of consistency, finding that the taxpayer had
represented either that the unenrolled agent had the requisite authority
or that the taxpayer was ratifying his actions. The taxpayer was bound
by that representation and could not later reject it. 116
Although the case entailed no conflict between representations made
as to different tax years, the reformulation would confirm the Griffith
holding. Had the consents been held invalid, it would have been impossi-
ble for the Service to have protected the statute of limitations by ob-
taining new consents. 117 Accordingly, the subsequent inconsistent
position was put forth "at a time when correction of the previous repre-
sentation would be effectively prevented by the statute of limitations." In
such cases, the duty of consistency should operate against intra-period
inconsistencies.
3. Effective Closure of Limitations Period
The Service cannot make a consistency adjustment unless, at the time
the subsequent, inconsistent representation is made, the statute of limita-
tions has run for the period affected by the prior representation. How
literally should this rule be applied? Suppose, for example, the taxpayer
advances his subsequent, inconsistent position only a few days before the
statute of limitations expires for the period of the first representation.,"8
Because it would be impossible for the Service in the time remaining to
issue a notice of deficiency with respect to that first tax period, the consis-
tency adjustment to the subsequent period should be permitted. A rule
permitting consistency adjustments when the prior tax period is effec-
112 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 220 (1988), supplemental opinion, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1263 (1989).
13 Id. at 224-25.
114 Rev. Proc. 68-20, 4.02(c), 1968-1 C.B. 812.
15 Griffith, 56 T.C.M. at 225.
116 Id. at 226.
117 The limitations period may not be extended by a consent signed after the limitations
period otherwise has expired. E.g., Melahn v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 769, 776-78 (1947).
118 See, e.g., Van Antwerp v. United States, 92 F.2d 871, 872 (9th Cir. 1937) (inconsistent
position taken one day before statute of limitations expired).
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tively closed to correction under the statute of limitations is calculated to
discourage blatant manipulation by inconsistent taxpayers. 19
A corollary issue is the amount of time the Service reasonably should
be given to issue a notice of deficiency or make an assessment with re-
spect to the tax period of the prior representation. Although a number of
analogies are available' 20 that might suggest a rule, the best is found in
Form 872-A which extends the limitations period until the ninetieth day
after, inter alia, the Service office handling the matter receives from the
taxpayer a termination of the extension. This suggests that the Service is
capable of issuing a notice of deficiency within 90 days after the trigger-
ing event-in that context, receipt of a notice from the taxpayer and, in
this context, receipt of the second representation. Accordingly, the 90-
day point is a serviceable starting demarcation. The statute of limitations
should be treated as effectively closed if the subsequent, inconsistent posi-
tion is brought to the Service's attention when fewer than 90 days remain
on the statute of limitations governing the tax period as to which the
prior representation was made.121
D. Affirmative Defenses
Upon satisfying the previously described elements,122 the government
should be held to have made out a prima facie case for application of the
duty of consistency. The taxpayer could attempt to defeat the consis-
119 One court precluded the taxpayer from shifting his position when the subs.equent repre-
sentation was made to the Service at the height of the filing season and only 16 days before
expiration of the limitations period as to the first tax year. Marm v. Anderson, 20 F. Supp.
643, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); cE. Joyce v. Gentsch, 141 F.2d 891, 896 (6th Cir. 1944) (denying the
consistency adjustment, but noting that the Service possessed the essential facts "[ijor a suffi-
cient period of time" before expiration of the statute of limitations period).
120 See, e.g., IRC § 6501(d) (usual three-year limitations period can be reduced to 18
months if a request for prompt assessment is filed with the Service); IRC § 6229(f) (one-year
assessment period against partners when their partnership items subject to the unified audit
rules become non-partnership items); IRC § 6503(j)(I) (statute of limitations is suspended for
at least 60 days, or 120 days if a court orders compliance with the summons, if a designated
summons is issued with respect to a corporate return). The lengthy periods of §§ 6501(d) and
6229(f) would restrict taxpayers unduly. Section 6503(j)(1) contemplates an audit already in
progress, which may not be true when the taxpayer attempts to withdraw the prior representa-
tion. Another analogy is suggested by the Bankruptcy Code. A bankruptcy trustee may re-
quest from the Service a determination of the amount of certain unpaid tax liabilities of the
bankruptcy estate. Generally, any deficiency determined by the Service more than 180 days
after such a request is submitted is void. 11 U.S.C. § 505(b)(l)(B) (1988). This suggests that
Congress believes the Service should be able to start and finish an audit within 180 days of its
being notified of the need to conduct one.
121 To a certain extent, the taxpayer would be in control of the situation since, if fewer than
90 days remained in the limitations period, the taxpayer could offer to execute a consent ex-
tending the period sufficiently that the attempted withdrawal would be more than 90 days
before expiration of the statute. See IRC § 6501(c)(4).
122 See Sections IV.A, IV.C.
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tency adjustment by negating one of the elements of the Service's case.
The reformulation would give the taxpayer a further opportunity to de-
feat the consistency adjustment by allowing him to attempt to prove that
there is an affirmative defense to the duty of consistency. The remainder
of this section discusses the applicable burden of proof and the specific
affirmative defenses which should be available to taxpayers.
1. Burden of Proof
The government now bears the burden of pleading and proving a con-
sistency adjustment although this precept sometimes is applied
loosely. 123 In contrast, under the reformulation, the burden of proof
would be split: The government would bear the burden of establishing
the elements of its prima facie case and the taxpayer would bear the bur-
den of establishing any affirmative defenses. The burden of pleading
would follow the burden of proof: The government would be obliged to
plead in its answer the elements of its prima facie case and the taxpayer
would be required to plead in its reply any special defenses.
There is ample precedent in tax practice for splitting the burden of
proof. It has become conventional to divide the burden of proof into two
aspects: the risk of nonpersuasion and the burden of production (also
called the burden of going forward). Often the taxpayer bears the risk of
nonpersuasion as to some of the issues while the Service bears that risk as
to other issues.1 24 Even as to individual issues, the Code splits the risk of
nonpersuasion in a number of instances. 25 Moreover, the burden of go-
ing forward as to an individual issue can shift from one party to the other
party.1 26 Thus, the technique advocated here-splitting the burden of
proof as to the duty of consistency between the taxpayer and the Ser-
vice-entails nothing more than the application to the consistency doc-
trine of an accepted approach.
123 See text accompanying notes 105-07.
124 In deficiency actions, the taxpayer bears the burden of persuasion as to the adjustments
contained in the notice of deficiency (with certain specified exceptions), but the Service bears
the burden as to any new issues it raises subsequent to the notice. E.g., Tax Ct. R. 142. In
refund actions, the burden of persuasion as to the cause of action is on the taxpayer, but a
complex allocation of the burden exists as to setoffs asserted by the government. See, e.g.,
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 338 F.2d 668 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
125 See IRC § 6902(a) (transferee liability for unpaid taxes); IRC § 7429(g)(1), (2) (jeop-
ardy and termination assessment).
126 See, e.g., IRC §§ 533(a), 534(a)-(c); Reg. §§ 1.533-1(a), (b); 1.534-2(b), (d) (accumulated
earnings tax); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964) (summons enforcement);
Murray v. United States, 292 F.2d 602, 603-04 (1st Cir. 1961) (statute of limitations);
Kamholz v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 11, 16-17 (1990) (injunction).
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2. Af rmative Defenses
This section proposes three affirmative defenses that should be avail-
able to taxpayers to defeat the duty of consistency even though the gov-
ernment has made its prima facie case. They are: (1) The statute of
limitations on the period of the first representation, although closed, can
be reopened under the mitigation provisions; (2) the taxpayer or his re-
lated person did not realize tax savings from the first representation; and
(3) the taxpayer attempted to withdraw the first representation before the
effective close of the statute of limitations on the first tax period.
In each case, this section establishes why the defense should defeat the
duty and why the burden of proof should be on the taxpayer rather than
the government. The focus in the first inquiry is on the policy values
enhanced by the duty of consistency. The second inquiry is primarily
concerned with the three elements that customarily govern the allocation
of the burden of proof: policy, probability and possession of proof.127
a. Applicability of Mitigation Provisions
Sections 1311 to 1314 describe conditions under which the government
may assert a deficiency (or the taxpayer claim a refund) despite the fact
that the statute of limitations for the applicable period has expired.' 28
When, as occasionally is the case, both the mitigation provisions and the
duty of consistency could apply to the same controversy, the mitigation
regime should preempt. The mitigation sections correct the tax period
affected by the first representation while the duty of consistency operates
on a subsequent tax period. Since many factors affecting calculation of
tax liability could change between the two periods, correcting the origi-
nal period entails greater precision and obviates the possibility of un-
dercorrection or overcorrection. Thus, the availability of the mitigation
remedy should be a defense against the duty of consistency.
This special defense should be pleaded and proven by the taxpayer.
Probability is one of the factors that usually govern allocation of the bur-
den of proof. In applying this factor, courts "ask 'what will be the prob-
able state of facts in most cases?' so that the burden of showing an
idiosyncratic course of events can be placed on the party asserting the
unusual." 129 This consideration suggests that the taxpayer should bear
the burden of proving that the mitigation provisions would apply to the
case. Were the nonavailability of mitigation an element of the Service's
prima facie case, mitigation would have to be analyzed and briefed in
127 See, e.g., 21 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure:
Evidence § 5122 (1977).
128 The statutory mitigation provisions and their relationship to the duty of consistency are
discussed in detail in Section V.A.
129 Wright & Graham, note 127, at 557.
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every consistency controversy. The mitigation provisions, however, will
not apply in most consistency cases. 130 Since it would be a waste of trial
resources to require analysis of these sections in every case, allocating the
burden of proof to the taxpayer is more efficient.
b. Absence of Prior Tax Saving
Case law on the duty of consistency suggests somewhat ambiguously
that the duty should apply only if the taxpayer's prior representation was
tax advantageous.131 The McMillan/Beltzer standard does not formally
require that the prior representation reduce the taxpayer's or related per-
son's tax bill, and the Beltzer district court stated that the enumerated
elements are the "sole" conditions for application of the duty. 132 On the
other hand, several decisions before and after Beltzer refused to hold the
taxpayer to the prior representation because it produced no tax saving.133
Under the reformulation, the taxpayer's failure to benefit from the first
representation would prevent application of the duty of consistency. The
policy values previously discussed generally would not be offended by
allowing a "no benefit" exception. Moreover, the goal of determination
of correct tax liability on an overall basis would be enhanced. Without
the exception, the taxpayer would have paid the right amount or too
much tax for the period of the first representation and, because the duty
of consistency would prevent him from shifting to a correct revised posi-
tion for the later period, also would pay too much tax for the later pe-
riod. Allowing a "no benefit" exception to the duty of consistency would
ameliorate this bias by allowing the taxpayer to shift to a different posi-
tion in the later year if the new position is substantively correct and the
prior position was not. On an overall basis, the total tax paid would be
correct or, at a minimum, closer to correct than the result reached under
the duty of consistency without a no benefit exception. Thus, the propo-
sal creates an exception to the duty of consistency for those instances in
which the representation made for the first period, compared to a possi-
ble alternative representation which would have been consistent with the
later representation, did not yield a tax saving for the taxpayer or related
person.
13o See text accompanying notes 150-57.
131 Many cases refer to the duty of consistency operating to prevent a tax windfall for the
taxpayer or, its flip side, an undue revenue detriment to the government. E.g., Building Syndi-
cate Co. v. United States, 292 F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 1961); Brown v. United States, 292 F.
Supp. 527, 532 (D. Or. 1968); Garner v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCII) 1181, 1187 (1981).
132 Beltzer v. United States, 73-2 U.S.T.C. 1 9512, at 81,620 (D. Neb. 1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d
211 (8th Cir. 1974).
133 E.g., Georgia Properties Co. v. Henslee, 138 F. Supp. 587, 590 (M.D. Tenn. 1955);
Union Carbide Corp. v. United States, 612 F.2d 558, 566 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Deviney Constr. Co.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 413, 415 (1977).
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The burden of proving the no benefit exception should be on the tax-
payer. Although some courts would place the burden of proving prior
benefit on the Service, making the duty of consistency inapplicable when
that burden is not discharged,134 this approach is ill-advised. Based on
both probability and possession of proof, this exception should be an af-
firmative defense to be proven by the taxpayer rather than an element of
the Service's prima facie case.
First, as with the mitigation remedy special defense, the no benefit de-
fense likely will operate in relatively few cases. In taking a position, a
taxpayer is not oblivious to consequences and generally will incline to-
ward the position yielding the lowest tax bill. Given the probabilities,
making the Service prove benefit in every case, when lack of benefit will
exist in few, would be an inefficient use of trial resources.
Second, the possession of proof consideration adverts to the relative
access of the parties to the facts needed to discharge the burden of proof.
The burden usually should be on the party with the greater capacity to
marshall the relevant information.13 5 In this instance, the taxpayer is
clearly that party. The taxpayer and his representatives will know far
better than the Service what considerations prompted the choice of one
representation over another, including the calculations of the relative tax
effects of the alternatives. Also, since consistency controversies often
span decades, the Service may not have retained its files or even the origi-
nal return. A taxpayer is more likely to have preserved books and
records and copies of tax returns and tax files.
Finally, there is a question whether the no benefit defense should ad-
vert to the specific amount of the tax saving. This affirmative defense
could be constructed along either of two lines. It could be the rule that
the defense would fail if the first representation produced any tax saving
at all in the year with respect to which it was made, whether that saving
was less than, equal to or more than the amount of tax that would be
recouped in the subsequent period by precluding the shift to an inconsis-
tent position. Alternatively, the rule could be that the amount of the
consistency adjustment in the subsequent period would be capped at the
amount of the tax saving realized by the taxpayer for the prior period.
For two reasons, this article rejects the second approach and recom-
mends that the no benefit defense should fail whenever the prior repre-
sentation was tax advantageous, irrespective of the amount of such
advantage. First, a dilemma exists with respect to interest on the tax
saving for the prior period. Were the cap computed without reference to
134 E.g., Hunt v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 791, 797-98 (1968).
135 The burden should be on the party "on whom it would sit lightest." Jeremy Bentham,
quoted in James B. Thayer, The Burden of Proof, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 45, 59 (1890); see, e.g.,
Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 96 (1961); Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83
T.C. 381, 468 (1984).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1991]
TAX LAW REVIEW
interest, the government would be prejudiced. If only the principal
amount of the first year's saving must be restored in the subsequent year,
the government effectively would be making interest-free loans (for years,
sometimes for decades) to inconsistent taxpayers. On the other hand, the
interest component would be large in most consistency cases, often in
excess of the principal. In all likelihood, the total of the first year's sav-
ing plus interest thereon would exceed the amount of the consistency
adjustment in the subsequent year in the overwhelming majority of cases.
Thus, including interest usually would render the cap a dead letter.
Second, the approach advocated here would harmonize the duty of
consistency with the tax benefit rule and the mitigation provisions, both
of which are qualitative, not quantitative, in thrust. For example, the tax
benefit rule does not apply when the previous deduction of the item pro-
duced no tax saving. 136 The focus is only on whether there was a saving;
the amount is irrelevant.1 37 The mitigation provisions, as they apply to
cases of double exclusion of an item, look only to whether the item was
present in the prior year; they are blind as to whether the item produced
a greater tax effect in the prior year than it would produce in the subse-
quent year. 138
c. Timely Attempt to Withdraw Prior Representation
The reformulation provides that an attempt by the taxpayer to recant
the prior representation at some time before the later representation is
made should be a defense against a consistency adjustment.1 39 The val-
ues fundamental to the tax system are not traduced by such a defense.
Moreover, it is a logical extension of the self-reporting system that tax-
payers be encouraged to report to the Service any errors they detect in
their prior tax representations.
However, it is necessary to guard against the obvious peril that the
existence of such a defense might lead some taxpayers to assert spurious
claims of attempts to withdraw. To deal with such claims effectively, the
defense should be qualified in three ways:
(1) The attempt to withdraw or correct the prior representa-
tion should not be admitted as a defense unless it was
received by the Service in such a fashion and at such a
136 IRC § 11I(a); see California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d
235, 238-39 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Central Loan & Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 981, 984
(1939).
137 E.g., Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 402 (Ct. CI. 1967).
138 E.g., United States v. Rachal, 312 F.2d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 1962); Cory v. Commissioner,
261 F.2d 702, 705 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959).
139 Some courts agree. E.g., Atlas Oil & Ref. Corp. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 552, 559-60
(1954); Rosensteel v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 1184, 1200-01 (1942).
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time that the Service had reasonable opportunity to deal
with it before expiration of the statute of limitations for
the period as to which that representation was made.
The rule as to when the statute of limitations is effec-
tively closed to correction' 40 should be applied to ascer-
tain whether the attempted withdrawal was timely.
(2) The attempt to withdraw or correct the prior representa-
tion must be made to the Service in writing. This would
reduce the possibility of this issue being decided on con-
flicting testimony about ambiguous words and actions.
(3) The attempted withdrawal must be clear and appar-
ent. 41  The rules under former § 6661 (now
§ 6662(b)(2), (d)) describing the form and content of a
disclosure statement sufficient to relieve the taxpayer of
liability for the substantial understatement penalty1 42
provide an analogy for what constitutes clear and appar-
ent withdrawal of a representation for duty of consis-
tency purposes.
The burden of proof as to this defense should be on the taxpayer. This
would further protect against spurious claims. Moreover, the difficulty
of trying to prove a negative is well known. 143 It makes more sense that
the taxpayer should have to show that an attempt to withdraw was made
than that the Service should have to show that no such attempt was
made.
V. RELATION TO OTHER MEANS OF ENFORCING TAXPAYER
CONSISTENCY
The duty of consistency does not exist in a vacuum. A number of
other mechanisms bear on the problem of taxpayer inconsistency, and
the relation of the duty to these other vehicles merits exploration. Hith-
erto, that exploration has been less than thorough. Most courts have
been content to discuss one of the mechanisms without reconciling it to
others. This section considers in detail the relationship of the duty of
consistency to other statutory, regulatory and judicial devices addressing
taxpayer inconsistency.
140 See text accompanying notes 118-21.
141 See Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 91 (1971), aff'd per curiam,
456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972) (enigmatic disclosure buried on a schedule M attached to a Form
1120 insufficient).
142 See Reg. § 1.6661-4.
143 See, e.g., Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1981).
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A. Relation to Statutory and Regulatory Anti-Inconsistency Rules
The Code and regulations contain many provisions designed to deter,
correct or punish inconsistent positions taken by taxpayers in different
tax periods. Examples include the accounting method rules under
§ 446,144 the inventory accounting rules under § 471,145 the rules relating
to adjustments required by a change in accounting method under
§ 481146 and a variety of other provisions. 147
While these measures certainly are meaningful within their demesnes,
their limited scope is such that a general anti-inconsistency doctrine is
necessary. A review of the most important statutory anti-inconsistency
mechanism-the statute of limitations mitigation provisions 14 8-makes
this clear.
The mitigation provisions allow the government to pursue a deficiency,
or the taxpayer to seek a refund, even though the statute of limitations
has expired for the period in question. Taxpayer inconsistency is a cen-
tral concept of the mitigation provisions. The legislative history makes it
clear that a purpose of the mitigation provisions is to take "the profit out
of inconsistency... whether fortuitous or the result of design."' 49
Although the mitigation provisions and the duty of consistency gener-
ally address the same problem, they differ in two key respects: effect and
coverage. If the mitigation provisions apply, the Service is permitted to
correct the error in the otherwise closed tax period. If the duty of con-
sistency applies, correction occurs in the open period by binding the tax-
payer to a position in that period that is consistent with her
representation in the closed period.
The coverage of the mitigation provisions is far less extensive than that
of the duty of consistency. Mitigation "does not purport to permit the
correction of all errors and inequities."'' 50 Reflecting this, the mitigation
sections are hedged with numerous technical rules circumscribing their
applicability, 151 and at least some decisions have held that the sections
144 See Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2).
145 See Reg. § 1.471-2(b).
146 See Reg. § 1.481-1(a)(1).
147 See, e.g., IRC § 338(0, (h)(4); Temp. Reg. § 1.338-4T(b)(5), (g) (§ 338 elections); IRC
§ 461(h)(3)(A)(iii) (recurring items exception to the economic performance rule); IRC
§ 6222(a) (reporting TEFRA partnership items); Rev. Rul. 85-18, § 3.04, 1985-1 C.B. 518
(relief provisions for employment tax); Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 C.B. 152 (installment method
rules).
148 IRC §§ 1311-1314.
149 S. Rep. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 49 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 779,
815.
1SO Brennen v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 495, 500 (1953).
151 With a variety of exceptions and additional elements, § 1311 relief depends on there
being (1) an error made in an otherwise closed tax period, (2) a determination as to the item
made with respect to another tax period or related taxpayer, (3) a statutorily enumerated cir-
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should be strictly construed. 152 Without traversing all galleries of the
mitigation labyrinth, three perspectives make it clear that §§ 1311 to
1314 govern far less than the universe of taxpayer inconsistency.
First, the mitigation sections allow the reopening of a closed income
tax period only.1 53 These rules do not apply to inconsistency-induced
underpayments of other kinds of tax. Second, even income tax under-
payments cannot be corrected by the mitigation provisions when the
prior inconsistency occurred with respect to a tax other than the income
tax. An essential element of mitigation is that there be a "determina-
tion," i.e., a final judicial decision or administrative action establishing
the correct tax treatment of the item. 54 Some courts have held that a
decision or action with respect to a tax other than the income tax cannot
constitute a determination for mitigation purposes. 155 For these courts,
an underpayment of income tax is shielded from correction whenever the
inconsistency relates to a tax other than the income tax, as frequently is
the case.156
Third, a major category of inconsistency cases involves taxpayers who
seek to exclude from both periods an income item that undoubtedly must
be included in one of the periods. The mitigation sections often do not
apply in these cases. The statute directs that in double exclusion of in-
come cases, there is no mitigation if, at the time the Service first main-
tained its position as to the open year, the other year already was
closed. 157 Because the two years often are separated by a decade or
more, the statute of limitations may be closed on the first year by the
time the Service discovers the inconsistency in the second year.
The partial overlap of the mitigation provisions and the duty of consis-
tency requires a determination of the relationship of the two doctrines.
One possible position is that, since Congress has enacted a statutory
scheme of correction, resort to judicial doctrines of correction such as the
duty of consistency is inappropriate, i.e., the statutory rules completely
cumstance of adjustment, and (4) maintenance of an inconsistent position by the party prevail-
ing in the determination. IRC §§ 1311(a), (b); 1312.
152 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Goldstein, 340 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1965); Muntwyler v.
United States, 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9252, at 83,553 (N.D. IM. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 703
F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1983); American Found. Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C 502, 509 (1943).
Contra O'Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 1985); First Nat'I Bank v.
United States, 565 F.2d 507, 516 (8th Cir. 1977).
153 IRC §§ 1312, 1314(e); Reg. § 1.1311(a)-2(b).
154 IRC §§ 1311(a), 1313(a).
155 E.g., Provident Nat'l Bank v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 1197, 1200-02 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Evans Trust v. United States, 462 F.2d 521, 524-25 (Ct. Cl. 1972). Contra Chertkof v. United
States, 676 F.2d 984, 987-90 (4th Cir. 1982).
156 For instance, the inconsistency often has been between an estate tax return and an in-
come tax return of a beneficiary. E.g., Griffith v. United States, 71-1 U.S.T.C. 9280 (N.D.
Tex. 1971); Church v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CC-) 1236 (1978).
157 IRC § 1311(b)(2)(A).
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preempt the field. A second possible position is partial preemption, i.e.,
that the mitigation provisions trump the duty of consistency only when
both regimes apply to the particular case. The third possible position is
no preemption, i.e., that the duty of consistency should be allowed to
operate in each particular case to which it applies regardless of whether
the mitigation provisions also would apply to that case. For the reasons
discussed below, this article advocates the partial preemption position.
1. Complete Preemption
In §§ 1311 to 1314, Congress crafted an exceedingly detailed response
to the inconsistency problem. A possible inference is that Congress in-
tended the detailed statutory rules to displace judicially crafted means of
discouraging or correcting taxpayer inconsistency. Although few consis-
tency cases address this inference, some courts incline toward 58 or
against 59 complete preemption.
The issue has arisen in more focused fashion in litigation concerning
another judicial rule, the doctrine of equitable recoupment. It is uncon-
troversial that equitable recoupment may apply when a case clearly falls
outside the ambit of the mitigation provisions, for example, when the tax
involved is other than the income tax.160 However, a number of deci-
sions have held that equitable recoupment does not apply when a case
falls within the general area of the mitigation sections even though, for
failure of one of the technical prerequisites, there is no mitigation in the
case.
161
Complete preemption should be rejected in the consistency context.
First, the legislative history of the mitigation sections is revealing. In
Congress' estimation, these sections were needed to "supplement the eq-
uitable principles applied by the courts."1 62 This language lends little
support to the notion that the mitigation provisions are exclusive and
preempt judicial doctrines of correction.
Second, a parallel can be drawn to the tax benefit rule. Originally judi-
cially created, that rule was partially codified in § 111. Yet, the judicial
158 B.C. Cook & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 516, 521-22 (1972); cf. Canelo v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 217, 227 (1969) (applicability of the mitigation provisions considered
in determining whether to apply the tax benefit rule), aff'd per curiam, 447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir.
1971).
159 Hess v. United States, 537 F.2d 457, 463 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 56 T.C. 82, 94 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972).
160 See, e.g., Boyle v. United States, 355 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. Bowcut,
287 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1961).
161 E.g., Benenson v. United States, 385 F.2d 26, 32-34 (2d Cir. 1967); Brigham v. United
States, 470 F.2d 571, 577-78 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1972). Contra Hufbauer v.
United States, 297 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Cal. 1968).
162 S. Rep. No. 1567, note 149, at 815 (emphasis added).
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rule continues. 163 If partial codification of the tax benefit rule does not
preempt the remainder of the judicial rule, it would seem incongruous to
hold that codification of the mitigation sections preempts application of
the duty of consistency.
Third, the case for complete preemption is undercut by the fact that
the duty of consistency and the mitigation provisions operate on different
tax periods: the former on the open period and the latter on the closed
period. This vitiates one of the rationales relied on in a leading complete
preemption case, Benenson v. United States.164 The court feared a circu-
larity. It believed that resolving the equitable recoupment issue is indis-
pensable to ascertaining whether the mitigation sections apply (since
making a "determination" requires fixing tax liability arising from the
transaction, which cannot be done without resolving the equitable re-
coupment issue), but resolving the mitigation issue is indispensable to
ascertaining whether equitable recoupment applies (since a prerequisite
to its application is that no adequate remedy at law, such as mitigation, is
available).165 Benenson's reasoning in this regard is not entirely convinc-
ing, and the feared circularity does not appear to be an insuperable diffi-
culty. Nevertheless, the important point is that, in a duty of consistency
case, the court would not be trapped in any circularity since that duty
and the mitigation provisions relate to different tax periods and so are
not interdependent.
2. Partial Preemption Versus No Preemption
The choice is thus between partial preemption (the duty of consistency
cannot be applied if the mitigation provisions would apply to the case)
and no preemption (the duty of consistency may be applied whether or
not the mitigation provisions also would apply). Relatively few decisions
have confronted this issue. Those that have, incline to the partial pre-
emption view. 166
Four considerations support partial preemption. First, the mitigation
provisions are statutory; the duty of consistency is entirely judicial. Be-
cause of congressional primacy in the field of taxation, it is natural to
accord greater deference to a statutory arrangement than to a judicial
rule when both apply to the same case.
Second, a no preemption regime would give the Service an excessive
degree of choice about the means to correct inconsistency. Under such a
163 Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 671 (1975).
164 385 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967).
165 Id. at 32 n.8.
166 See Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1956): Greenwood Pack-
ing Plant v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 787, 790 (4th Cir. 1942); Kenosha Auto Transp. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 28 T.C. 421, 425-26 (1957).
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regime, the Service would have the option of asserting a deficiency in the
open period under the duty of consistency or of asserting a deficiency in
the closed period under the mitigation provisions. Presumably, the Ser-
vice would make this choice with an eye to which approach would gener-
ate more revenue. Yet most tax professionals, tax administrators and
taxpayers would feel more comfortable if the Service enforced clear rules
with definite revenue consequences, rather than calculated the effects of
alternative procedures and chose among them based on their revenue
results.
Third, another consequence of choice is unpredictability and lack of
uniformity. In all probability, the Service would choose to proceed with
respect to the open period sometimes and the closed period other times,
with no fixed principle other than revenue maximization to guide its
choice. A congressional objective in enacting the mitigation provisions
was to introduce greater uniformity and predictability into this area than
had been achieved under judicial doctrines of correction. 167 A partial
preemption rule would serve this end better than a no preemption rule.
Fourth, and most importantly, a partial preemption rule would better
comport with the imperative of determining correct tax liability. As
noted previously, when the open period is corrected under the duty of
consistency, the potential for imprecision exists. There may be overcor-
rection or undercorrection of the error introduced in the closed period.
Mitigation avoids this problem since it operates on the otherwise closed
period.
But the matter is far from one sided. Substantial arguments can be
arrayed in support of a no preemption rule. For the most part, these
arguments sound in the potentially cumbersome procedural situation
that partial preemption could engender. Partial preemption typically
would entail two stages of litigation Initially, the government's assertion
of an underpayment for the open period based on the duty of consistency
would be tested in a deficiency action or a refund action. In that action,
the taxpayer would assert as a defense that the putatively closed period is
subject to correction under the mitigation rules and, thus, that the duty
of consistency is preempted. If the taxpayer prevails, the government
would lose the underpayment for the open period. Resorting to mitiga-
tion, the government then would issue a second statutory notice of defi-
ciency-this time with respect to the prior period-which could be
contested by the taxpayer in a second case.
In attempting to avoid two stages of litigation, the common sense ex-
pedient would be for the government to issue one statutory notice which
would assert a deficiency for the open period under the duty of consis-
tency and, in the alternative, a deficiency for the closed period under the
167 S. Rep. No. 1567, note 149, at 815.
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mitigation provisions. If successful, this strategy would telescope the
proceedings, allowing one court to make a determination as to the open
year and then to decide whether the closed year could be reopened via
the mitigation sections.
Unfortunately, this expedient is not possible. A determination is a pre-
requisite to mitigation, 68 and, in an unagreed case in which the Service is
asserting an underpayment, the determination would have to be a court
decision. 169 However, to constitute a determination, the court decision
must be final. Since finality does not occur until after expiration of the
appeal period, 170 the court making the determination lacks jurisdiction to
grant § 1311 relief since the finality of its own judgment is prerequisite to
such relief. 171
Thus, unless the government prevails in the first case, the partial pre-
emption view seems to require two levels of litigation. Several undesir-
able outcomes could eventuate. For one, taxpayers would be sorely
tempted to resist the duty of consistency adjustment in the open year by
assuring the court that the Service could reopen the closed year under
the mitigation sections. Then, when the Service attempts so to do, the
taxpayer would protest that the mitigation sections really do not apply to
the case after all. An object of the duty of consistency is to discourage
unseemly positional gymnastics by taxpayers. This object is not ad-
vanced by the two-stage litigation required by the partial preemption
view.
A compounding problem is the possibility that the taxpayer might pre-
vail at both stages, defeating both the consistency claim in the open year
and the mitigation claim in the closed year, thus escaping proper tax
entirely. Of course, this problem would materialize only if the courts in
each case reach different conclusions as to whether the mitigation provi-
sions apply. While hopefully this would not be a routine occurrence,
given the hypertechnical contents of §§ 1311 to 1314,172 the possibility
cannot be excluded entirely.173
168 IRC § 1311(a).
169 IRC § 1313(a)(1).
170 See, e.g., IRC § 7481(a), (b) (finality of Tax Court decisions).
1 See, eg., Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 613 F.2d 518, 527 (5th Cir. 1980);
Cory v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 702, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1958).
172 The mitigation provisions have been described as "among the most arcane and techni-
cal" sections of the Code. Gindes v. United States, 661 F.2d 194, 200 n.18 (Ct. Cl. 1981); see
O'Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1985).
173 For an actual example, see B.C. Cook & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 516 (1972)
[hereinafter Cook 1]; B.C. Cook & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 422 (1975) [hereinafter
Cook I], aff'd per curiam, 584 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1978). The taxpayers bookkeeper embezzled
funds by writing checks for fictitious purchases, which were reflected on its return as part of
cost of goods sold, thus reducing its taxable income. Cook I, 59 T.C. at 518. In a later year,
the taxpayer discovered the embezzlement and claimed a theft loss deduction, which was disal-
lowed by the Service. Id. at 519. The Tax Court upheld the claimed § 165 deduction despite
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Finally, the two-stage litigation required by a partial preemption ap-
proach delays the final resolution of the controversy, multiplies the in-
convenience and expense suffered by the parties, and places additional
demands on limited judicial resources. These process costs should not be
taken lightly.
Thus, there are strong arguments in favor of a no preemption rule, and
the choice between such a rule and a partial preemption rule is a close
one. Nevertheless, this article concludes that the arguments in favor of
partial preemption are more persuasive. Additional taxpayer positional
inconsistency, although unsavory, becomes seriously deleterious only if
the strategy succeeds. To prevent that, we must depend on the courts,
assisted by diligent counsel, to apply the law correctly. The process costs
are troubling, but they are the price to be paid for the statutory scheme
Congress established. 174
In summary, the mere existence of §§ 1311 to 1314 should not pre-
clude application of the duty of consistency when the facts of the case fall
within the general ambit of those sections but mitigation cannot be ef-
fected due to failure of a technical element. However, when all technical
elements are satisfied and the closed year is amenable to correction via
mitigation, the government should be required to use such correction in
preference to correcting the open year through the duty of consistency.
B. Relation to Other Judicial Anti-Inconsistency Rules
1. Reach of Other Judicial Rules
The duty of consistency is not the only judicially crafted device that
can be brought to bear against taxpayer inconsistency. As noted previ-
ously, at least six such devices were ancestral to the duty: election,
waiver, equitable estoppel, principles of contract, general equitable con-
siderations in refund cases and statutory construction preference.
None of these doctrines can operate as a general substitute for the duty
of consistency. Election and waiver apply to relatively few cases because,
properly construed, they depend on the taxpayer's having an option as to
tax treatment and the Code usually mandates how transactions are to be
the fact that doing so allowed the taxpayer to reduce its taxable income twice on account of the
same item. The court rejected the Service's consistency argument, advising the Service that its
recourse was the mitigation sections. Id. at 522. The Service then issued a statutory notice for
the year the cost of goods sold was improperly inflated, relying on the mitigation sections to
oppose the taxpayer's statute of limitations contention. Cook II, 65 T.C. at 422, 425-26. Re-
canting its Cook I position, the Tax Court held for the taxpayer again, finding that cost of
goods sold is not a "deduction" as that term of art is used in the Code, thus that there had been
no double deduction so that the mitigation provisions did not apply after all. Id. at 428.
174 See Benenson v. United States, 385 F.2d 26, 34 (2d Cir. 1967).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 46:
DUTY OF CONSISTENCY
treated.1 75 Equitable estoppel requires satisfaction of more elements than
the duty of consistency and so will operate less often.176 Contractual
principles and the constructional preference are rare in contemporary tax
litigation.177
The remaining ancestral theme-general equitable considerations in
refund cases-has over the decades separated into three reasonably dis-
tinguishable doctrines: the duty of consistency, the doctrine of set-off
and the doctrine of equitable recoupment. As refund litigation doctrines,
set-off and equitable recoupment suffer from the common limitation that
they are defensive only. They may operate to reduce or eliminate a re-
fund sought by a taxpayer for an open tax period, but they provide no
affirmative basis on which the government can assert a deficiency.178
Moreover, even when the government is in a defensive posture in a
refund action, set-off and equitable recoupment often are less than fully
satisfactory. Set-off customarily is thought to be limited to situations in-
volving the same tax, the same taxpayer and the same tax period.' 79
Thus, it cannot reach the multi-year effects typical of inconsistency cases.
Equitable recoupment may reach different kinds of tax, different, but
related, taxpayers8 0 and different tax periods, but it has two serious limi-
tations. First, as previously noted, the prevalent view is that equitable
recoupment is displaced by the statute of limitations mitigation provi-
sions whenever the particular case is within the general ambit of those
provisions even if mitigation is not possible for failure of one or another
of the technical elements. Second, equitable recoupment operates only
when the taxes to be recouped arose from the same taxable event or
transaction that gave rise to the overpayment sought to be refunded,
175 See, e.g., Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376, 378-79 (6th Cir. 1956).
176 See text accompanying notes 90-100.
177 Another judicial anti-inconsistency device, the doctrine of judicial estoppel, was not an-
cestral to the duty of consistency although it sometimes is confused with it, see, e.g., DiLeo v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 304, 310 (1989). Judicial estoppel will operate in few cases.
Under that doctrine, a party "who has obtained relief from an adversary by asserting and
offering proof to support one position may not be heard later in the same court to contradict
himself in an effort to establish against the same adversary a second claim inconsistent with his
earlier contention." Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953). Thus, as
pertinent here, judicial estoppel would be available only if the prior representation had b=en
made in a proceeding in the same court hearing the later case.
178 E.g., Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 539, modified, 302 U.S. 639 (1937); O'Brien v.
United States, 766 F.2d 1038, 1049 (7th Cir. 1985).
179 See, e.g., Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 282-83 (1932); Patterson v. Belcher, 302 F.2d
289, 295 (5th Cir. 1962).
ISO It is not settled which relationships suffice to allow application of equitable recoupment
to recover taxes owed by one taxpayer out of taxes otherwise refundable to another taxpayer.
See generally Stone, 301 U.S. at 535-38; Edmonds v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 14, 17 (gth Cir.),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 713 (1937); Hufbauer v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 247, 250-52 (S.D.
Cal. 1968); Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1371 (Ct. CI. 1969).
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a requirement that usually is construed narrowly.""1 Since a taxpayer
inconsistency case typically involves related events or transactions,
rather than a single event or transaction, this rule sharply reduces the
utility of equitable recoupment as a means of curbing or redressing such
inconsistency. 18 2
One final anti-inconsistency device, the tax benefit rule,'8 3 will overlap
with the duty of consistency in some cases. Although the tax benefit rule
is a useful weapon in the anti-inconsistency arsenal, it is not sufficient.
First, its parameters are still uncertain. 8 4
Second, the tax benefit rule is triggered only by cases in which the first
operative event is a deduction or a credit taken for an item. Many incon-
sistency cases-for example, double exclusion of income cases-are not
marked by that event, so cannot be reached by the tax benefit rule. 18 5
Third, the Tax Court and some other courts have held that the tax bene-
fit rule does not operate if the deduction was legally improper when
taken in the now-closed period. 1 6 Of course, this would leave a yawning
chasm for inconsistency, and one in which, incongruously, the worst sort
of inconsistency-inconsistency shielding a clearly improper tax un-
derpayment-would be the one least open to correction. The Tax Court
has enlisted the duty of consistency to avoid these results, holding that
the duty, if applicable, vitiates the erroneous deduction exception to the
181 See, e.g., Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 302-03 (1946); Min-
skoff v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1146, 1148-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 490 F.2d
1283 (2d Cir. 1974); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 954, 962 (W.D.
Mo. 1965), aff'd as to other issues, 370 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1967).
182 See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 276 F.2d 17, 33 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
183 Originally a judicial doctrine like the duty of consistency, the tax benefit rule has been
limited, and, except as so limited, has been implicitly approved, by § 111 and regulations
promulgated thereunder.
184 The tax benefit rule has two aspects. Originally, the rule required the inclusion in gross
income of items which a taxpayer had deducted in a prior tax year and then recovered in a
subsequent year. See, e.g., Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1943). The other
aspect of the rule emanates from the Supreme Court's decision in Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983) (consolidated with United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc.). The
court found that a recovery is not always essential if a subsequent event was fundamentally
inconsistent with the prior deduction. "Fundamental inconsistency" means that "if [the] event
had occurred within the same taxable year [as the deduction was taken], it would have fore-
closed the deduction." Id. at 383-84.
It is not yet clear how large a role Hillsboro National Bank will play. In that decision, the
Supreme Court itself appeared to urge caution in application of the broader aspect of the tax
benefit rule. Id. at 383. Whether for this reason or because of their own hesitancy, the lower
courts have not pushed Hillsboro National Bank aggressively. See, e.g., Rojas v. Commis-
sioner, 90 T.C. 1090 (1988), aff'd, 901 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1990).
18s5 For a suggestion that the tax benefit rule should apply more broadly, see Del Cotto &
Joyce, note 60.
186 See text accompanying notes 43-46.
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tax benefit rule.18 7 There can be no clearer demonstration that the tax
benefit rule cannot do the anti-inconsistency job alone.
2. Combining the Duty of Consistency with Other Judicial Rules
When the duty of consistency and some other judicial doctrine both
apply to a given case, should one preempt the other? This question has
been little discussed in the case law. In one of the few exceptions, the
Sixth Circuit rejected the government's duty of consistency argument,
concluding that the duty of consistency should not apply because the
government had available to it a remedy under the doctrine of equitable
recoupment.' 88 The court made no attempt to propound a comprehensi-
ble theory as to why the government should be required to proceed under
equitable recoupment rather than under the duty of consistency, assum-
ing that both doctrines applied to the case.
This article rejects this approach. When two or more judicial doc-
trines of correction apply to a case, the government should be free to
proceed under any or all of them. The availability of the duty of consis-
tency should not prevent the government from asserting instead, or in
addition, any other applicable judicial doctrine. Furthermore, the availa-
bility of another judicial doctrine should not prevent the government
from asserting the duty of consistency.
The above conclusion is based on the fact that, in contrast to the con-
siderations that allow the statutory mitigation provisions to preempt
when applicable, there is no principle that argues with any particular
force for preferring one judicial rule to another. Since all the available
doctrines are basically judge made, considerations of comity do not oper-
ate with great force. 189 Moreover, as discussed above, concerns of exces-
sive Service discretion, unpredictability, lack of uniformity and distortion
of correct taxable income weigh heavily in the duty of consistency versus
mitigation context. Because all the judicial remedies operate on the open
tax period and not the closed one, these concerns are irrelevant in the
duty of consistency versus other judicial doctrines context.
Thus, there should be no requirement that any judicial doctrine of cor-
rection necessarily be used instead of any other such doctrine. However,
although not required, it would not be surprising to see the duty of con-
sistency emerge in actual practice as a principal remedy in this area. The
duty of consistency is among the most flexible of the remedies, and its
187 E.g., Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, aff'd per curiam, 456 F.2d
622 (5th Cir. 1972).
188 Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1956), rev'g 55-1 U.S.T.C. r
9124 (S.D. Ohio 1954).
189 The partial codification of the tax benefit rule is less than overwhelming since the main
thrust of § 111 is its exclusionary aspect, not its inclusionary aspect.
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ability to reach a wide variety of inconsistencies is important. Precisely
because it is not bound by many of the limitations described above with
respect to alternative judicial doctrines, the duty of consistency is likely
in the final analysis to preponderate over most of the alternative
doctrines.
Such a development would have a wholesome side effect: It would
contribute to procedural simplification of the tax law. Two examples
highlight this possibility. First, there will be few, if any, cases to which
the doctrine of election would apply to which the duty of consistency
would not also apply. Hence, the former can be largely subsumed in the
latter. Second, the Tax Court and the parties appearing before it now are
forced to undergo an exhausting drill in erroneous deduction tax benefit
rule cases. They must first ascertain whether the usual requirements of
the tax benefit rule are satisfied. Subsequently, they must determine
whether the erroneous deduction exception applies, and whether the duty
of consistency applies to vitiate that exception. The presentation and de-
cision of these cases would be simplified considerably were the cases ana-
lyzed under the duty of consistency from the start rather than under the
tax benefit rule. The court and the parties could then begin and often
end with the last of the above analytical stages.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ralph Waldo Emerson once observed:
A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by
little statesmen, and philosophers and divines. With consis-
tency a great soul has simply nothing to do .... Speak what
you think today in hard words and tomorrow speak what to-
morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every-
thing you said today.190
Whatever the utility of this advice as a precept for personal develop-
ment and social discourse, demanding positional consistency from tax-
payers is neither foolish nor a fetish of the petty. This article has
suggested a number of doctrinal revisions and clarifications to maximize
the contribution of the taxpayer duty of consistency to the tax system
and to help harmonize it with other judicial and statutory devices.
The unifying elements of the proposed reformulation are both philo-
sophical and procedural. Philosophically, it is time to change the context
within which consistency decisions are made from a moral clash focusing
on the respective culpabilities of the two parties before the court into a
190 Ralph W. Emerson, Self-Reliance, in Essays: First Series (1841).
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policy-based deliberation pivoting on the effects that the doctrinal alter-
natives have on key tax system values. Procedurally, the needed changes
are best achieved through splitting the burden of proof, requiring the
Service to prove the elements of its prima facie case and, after such ele-
ments have been established, requiring the taxpayer to bear the burden as
to any special defenses against a consistency adjustment. Choices about
who bears the burden as to each item again should be made by reference
to concrete policy values and the objectives of the taxpayer duty of
consistency.
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